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This work is an exploration of Hannah Arendt’s portrait of Rosa Luxemburg. Beginning 
with a few minor discussions of Luxemburg in her first major work Origins of Totalitarianism 
(1951), the socialist revolutionary’s place in the constellation of figures that appear in Arendt’s 
work grew over the course of her career.  Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg culminated in “A 
Heroine of Revolution,” which appeared in the New York Review of Books, and in Men in Dark 
Times (1968). Yet Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg was notable for its excision of her revolutionary 
Marxism in the process of sculpting Luxemburg into a figure who reflected Arendt’s own 
philosophical and revolutionary political theories. This piece is a work of both intellectual history 
and comparative political theory, exploring the development of Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg 
through her life and her written works. Furthermore, it will explore the thinkers’ shared ambivalent 
relationship to women’s movements and the paradoxical applicability of their thinking to later 
feminist theory. The resulting combination of theoretical and personal influences articulate the 
points of commonality between the thinkers and their major differences—differences which Arendt 
failed to incorporate into her portrait. The resulting comparative analysis between the revolutionary 
thought of Arendt and Luxemburg explores the relationship between democracy and revolution in 
v	 
modern political thought. While both thinkers rely upon their notions of revolution to bring 
substantial meaning to democracy, this thesis problematizes, rather than resolves the relationship 
between revolution and democracy as laid out in both Luxemburg’s and Arendt’s claims.  
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Introduction 
 2019 marks the hundredth anniversary of the murder of Rosa Luxemburg. Killed in the 
Spartacist Uprising during the German Revolution, Luxemburg’s murder at the hands of the 
Freikorps presaged the subsequent “dark times.” Luxemburg’s legacy is remarkably contested, 
whether as a precursor to Leninism, as an ultra-left deviation of Orthodox Marxism, or as a 
martyr of revolutionary democracy. The role of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
(SPD) in suppressing the Spartacist Uprising further exacerbated a division between socialists 
and communists in Germany, which severely limited the possibility of unity in the face of the 
rising threat of fascism during the following decades. Within this contested legacy, Hannah 
Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg is particularly notable. Arendt painted a portrait of Luxemburg 
as a thinker devoted to freedom and critical of Marxism (rather than someone simply against 
rival Marxists within the socialist movement). Arendt’s own interest in revolutionary ideas was 
an attempt to recover the “lost treasure” of revolution—the connection between the revolutionary 
spirit and freedom—in contrast to the rising threat of totalitarianism. Beyond a shared interest in 
revolutionary ideas, both thinkers possessed many notable similarities. Both were women in a 
field dominated by men, both were Jewish thinkers in a German milieu, and both held a strong 
distinction between their private lives and the need to act politically in public. These affinities 
between the figures were so strong that German director, Margarethe von Trotta, cast the same 
actor, Barbara Sokuwa, as the titular characters in the biographical films Rosa Luxemburg (1986) 
and Hannah Arendt (2012). 
The personal affinity between Arendt and Luxemburg was not a connection that Arendt 
sought to reject. In a letter to her husband, Heinrich Blücher, in 1958, Arendt relayed a story in 
which she was introduced at a lecture in Munich and was compared to both Ricarda Huch and 
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Rosa Luxemburg. Arendt wrote, “I answered, without reacting to Huch, that I was very honored 
to have my name and Rosa Luxemburg’s mentioned in the same breath.”1 Yet following a purely 
biographical approach, with its emphasis on an individual psychohistory, one may risk 
misreading Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg as a purely personal matter. After the publication of 
Men in Dark Times, Mary McCarthy wrote to Arendt describing an interaction with a partygoer 
who called her essay on Luxemburg “Hannah’s most personal work.” McCarthy wrote, “her idea 
was that you ‘identified’ with Rosa Luxemburg, seeing her quarrel with the German Socialists as 
your quarrel with the organized Jews. ‘Such passion,’ etc. I told her that I did not see this at all, 
in fact became rather annoyed at her insistence.”2 Such a misunderstanding of Arendt’s portrait 
of Luxemburg could easily arise from an attempt to psychoanalyze or to read more personal 
intentions into Arendt’s portrait than are present in the works themselves. There is a danger in 
allowing the personal category of Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg to supersede the theoretical. 
 At the core of Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg is their shared interested in the political 
concept of spontaneity. Both figures embraced the element of spontaneity as the source of the 
energy that drives revolutions forward. However, what each figure meant by spontaneity is quite 
different. Arendt’s notion of spontaneity was rooted in her ontological concept of Natality—the 
human capacity for newness that serves as the foundation of freedom. The emergence of 
democratic councils in revolutions without any continuity between them was, for Arendt, 
evidence of their embeddedness in the human condition, rather than in a historical tradition of 
																																								 																				
1 Arendt to Heinrich Blücher, July 1958, in Within Four Walls: The Correspondence between 
Hannah Arendt and Heinrich Blücher 1936-1968, ed. Lotte Kohler, trans. Peter Constantine 
(New York City: Harcourt Books, 1996), 323–33. 
2 Arendt to Mary McCarthy, October 11 1966, in Between Friends: The Correspondence of 
Hannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy 1949-1975, ed. Carol Brightman, 1st ed. (New York City: 
Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1995), 196. 
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revolution. Arendt judged revolutionaries according to their willingness to recognize and channel 
these spontaneous energies into new political forms—most ideally into direct democracies. The 
key for Arendt was that these new political forms are not influenced by calls for political action 
to resolve economic or social problems, because the conditions of a realm, the Social, threatened 
the emergence of spontaneity and political freedom. The Social, a product of growing social and 
economic problems within society, threatens to erode political life and thus undermine the basis 
of human freedom.  
 Luxemburg’s own understanding of spontaneity was quite different. In “The Mass Strike” 
(1906), Luxemburg articulated her concept of spontaneity that was inspired by her participation 
in the Revolution of 1905 in the Russian Empire.  Focusing on the interrelationship between 
economic and political struggles, Luxemburg proposed a dialectical strategy of spontaneity and 
organization. Spontaneity, expressed through the mass strike, was for Luxemburg, “not a crafty 
method discovered by subtle reasoning for the purpose of making the proletarian struggle more 
effective, but the method of motion of the proletarian mass, the phenomenal form of the 
proletarian struggle in the revolution.”3 Superficially, in her belief that parties cannot “make” a 
revolution, and in her commitment to following the revolutionary impulses of the initial outbreak 
of revolution, Luxemburg’s notion is quite similar to Arendt’s own understanding of revolution.  
In critical ways, the differences between them are such that Arendt’s portrait extrudes 
Marxism from her interpretation of Luxemburg in order to situate her within her ontological 
political framework. In contrast to Arendt, Luxemburg identifies the source of spontaneity within 
																																								 																				
3 Rosa Luxemburg, “The Mass Strike, the Political Party, and the Trade Unions,” in The Rosa 
Luxemburg Reader, ed. Kevin B. Anderson and Peter Hudis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
2008), 192. Italics in original.  
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economic struggles, rather than an ontological site of Natality outside of it. Rather than keeping 
the political separate from the economic, Luxemburg’s revolutionary theory is centered on the 
dialectical interrelationship between them in which “this sudden change of the economic struggle 
into the political and the political struggle into the economic is possible.”4 Finally, Luxemburg 
articulated a role for the socialist party organization to escalate and elevate the struggles into 
ever greater levels of political action and thus raise the overall class consciousness of the 
proletariat.5 On these points, the framework of Arendt’s ontological politics would allow no 
crossover and her resulting interpretation of Marx further drove a gap between her own and 
Luxemburg’s revolutionary theories.  
As a result, several conflicts that Luxemburg had with other Marxists in the socialist 
movement are also evidence of an extrusion of Marxism from Arendt’s thought. Within the SPD, 
Karl Kautsky is the guiltiest, because of his economism and political inaction. For Arendt, this 
lack of action and a decisive revolutionary theory was the opposite of politics. Luxemburg’s 
Accumulation of Capital, with its non-Marxist theory of imperialism and belief in the spontaneity 
of the masses thus seemingly contradicted these fundamental precepts of the non-political 
aspects of Marxist ideology and instead crossed over into Arendt’s understanding of the realm of 
Action and politics. The result of Arendt’s extrusion of Marxism from her portrait of Luxemburg 
does not just involve theoretical aspects, but also an entire interpretation of Second International 
Socialism and the SPD to which Luxemburg’s legacy is inevitably tied. Arendt articulated 
Luxemburg’s theoretical battles within the socialist movement as indications of not just a critical 
stance towards Marxism, but as a method of crafting a portrait in which Luxemburg’s political 
																																								 																				
4 Luxemburg, 197. 
5 Luxemburg, 199. 
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thought stands outside of its historical context. As a result, Arendt is able to transform 
Luxemburg into a model for her revolutionary ideas but at the cost of a violence towards the 
socialist revolutionary’s actual commitments and ideas.  
Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg as a committed, but non-Marxist, revolutionary has been 
interpreted as somewhat of an oddity by theorists, both Marxist and not. From the Marxist 
perspective, the fact that Arendt was incorrect in her assessment of Luxemburg’s commitment to 
Marxist theory and economic justice is key. Peter Hudis argues that while “few would deny that 
Luxemburg has provided moral inspiration for many thinkers and activists, inside and outside of 
the Marxist tradition—especially because of her fierce political, theoretical and personal 
independence,” Luxemburg herself was deeply embedded in and committed to Marxist theory.6 
Hudis argues that while Luxemburg was willing to fiercely critique many aspects of Marxist 
theoretical orthodoxy, “she saw such criticism as the essence of Marxism, not as a departure 
from it.”7 Reflecting the view of sympathetic critics outside of the Marxist tradition, Margaret 
Canovan, in Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought, listed Luxemburg 
amongst disparate figures from which Arendt took inspiration for her theory of council 
republicanism, including Montesquieu, Tocqueville and Clemenceau.8 Yet Luxemburg’s place in 
Arendt’s republicanism was linked to her separation of political and economic issues, which 
Canovan argues: 
																																								 																				
6 Peter Hudis, “Introduction: Luxemburg in Our Time,” in Rosa Luxemburg, J.P. Nettl, (New 
York City: Verso Books, 2019), xx. 
7 Hudis, “Introduction: Luxemburg in Our Time,” xx.  
8 Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 212. 
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For most of Arendt’s readers her views in this area are something of an embarrassment, a 
curiously unrealistic commitment in someone who laid particular stress of realism in 
politics. Even as an ideal, the model she describes is fatally damaged by the view of 
economics which we noticed in an earlier chapter in connection with her concept of 
“society.” Only her assumptions about the convergence of capitalism and socialism on 
provision for a collective life process can explain her belief that economic matters in 
affluent societies are essentially uncontroversial and therefore unpolitical, and that her 
councils would be able to stay out of the economic decisions taken by professional 
administrators, leaving the material welfare of the society to be looked after without 
needing to be on the political agenda.9 
As Canovan points out, Arendt’s position on the separation between economic and political 
matters is difficult to reconcile with the reality of modern political life. By collapsing socialism 
into capitalism, Arendt reduces the fundamental distinctions between both systems into a broad 
category that encompasses the major economic systems of her contemporary political reality. As 
Canovan argues, it is difficult to read Arendt without having to reckon with this strict separation 
between the Political and the Social. Other Arendtian concepts are more open to debate, such as 
the extent of the centrality of the Graecophilic concepts to her political thought, or her 
relationship to modernity. However, as this paper will show, the core of Arendt’s portrait of Rosa 
Luxemburg results from Arendt’s concept of the Social and the subsequent separation of 
economic and political interests.  
																																								 																				
9 Canovan, 237. 
	 7	
While it is a relatively simple matter to show the disconnect between Arendt’s 
presentation of Luxemburg and Luxemburg’s own political thought, examining the origins of the 
portrait is more fruitful in drawing implications of Arendt’s political thought. A reading of 
Arendt’s portrait and the resulting encounter between Luxemburg and Arendt reveals differences 
not only in revolutionary strategy, but also in the relationships of their wider projects to 
modernity and democracy.  Because Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg emerges across several of 
her works, an exploration of her project is at once a work of intellectual history and comparative 
political theory. Arendt articulates her portrait of Luxemburg through the lens of the ontological 
political concepts developed in The Human Condition. As a result of Arendt’s concept of the 
Social, Marxism is pried from Luxemburg’s political thought. The resulting portrait of 
Luxemburg is a reflection more of Arendt’s philosophical and revolutionary ideas than of 
Luxemburg’s own. An analysis of Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg reveals the distance between 
the dialectical method of the socialist revolutionary, and Arendt’s revolutionary heroism and 
idealized form of direct democracy. The resulting visions of democracy offer differing 
relationships to modernity. While Arendt aims to build a democratic bulwark against the anti-
political threats embedded in modern social life, Luxemburg’s socialist democracy aims to bring 
democracy to those very aspects which Arendt believes degrade and destroy human freedom.  
 Why the word “portrait” to describe Arendt’s conception of Luxemburg rather than 
influence? Scholars have differing views on the extent or nature of Luxemburg’s influence or 
role in Arendt’s political thought. Canovan names Luxemburg as an influence on Arendt’s theory 
of republicanism10, and lists her as one of Arendt’s “heroes” of classical republicanism.11 Seyla 
																																								 																				
10 Canovan, 20. 
11 Canovan, 202. 
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Benhabib specifically states that Luxemburg serves as an influence on Arendt’s thought.12 
Elizabeth Young-Bruehl notes that Arendt began planning On Revolution while reading 
Luxemburg’s “The Russian Revolution.”13 Yet outside of these areas, Arendt herself never lists 
Luxemburg as a major influence. Instead, she notes the moments where Luxemburg comes to the 
same conclusions as Arendt on politics, often using her as a model revolutionary who is a 
perceptive witness to revolution and dark times. While Luxemburg’s influence on Origins and 
biographical connection to Arendt form a portion of Arendt’s use of Luxemburg in her corpus, 
the core of her portrait of Luxemburg emerged as an example of the ontological political ideas 
and revolutionary theory developed in The Human Condition. Thus the concept of a portrait 
better captures a picture of a figure that goes beyond influence. This is not to say that Arendt’s 
portrait is a simple mapping of her ideas onto Luxemburg. Arendt’s portrait of Rahel Varnhagen 
is perhaps the closet analog to her discussions of Luxemburg. As in her portrait of Varnhagen, 
Arendt is willing to engage personally with her subject and to see, through her personal affinity, 
a figure who can serve as a political and personal witness to history. Framing Arendt’s use of 
Luxemburg as a portrait captures both the personal and theoretical aspects of this use in her 
work.  
 The first section of this paper will explore the genesis of Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg. 
Focusing on Arendt’s published works and letters, this section will complete a picture that 
emerged piecemeal until Men in Dark Times. The entwining of personal affinity and theoretical 
development of the portrait is not intended as a psychohistory. However, the full portrait of 
																																								 																				
12 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield 
Publishers Inc., 2000), 78. 
13 Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1982), 294. 
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Luxemburg and her role in Arendt’s thinking cannot emerge until some biographical details, 
such as Blücher’s participation in the Spartacist Uprising, and the political leadership struggles 
of the early Kommunistiche Partei Deutschlands (KPD) are clear. Thus, the biographical aspects 
of the work are intended to illuminate the theoretical aspects of her portrait, rather than collapse 
them into the personal. The goal of this approach is to explore the development of Arendt’s 
portrait and to highlight the influence of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The years that 
followed the revolution, years that Arendt spent reflecting on it and writing The Human 
Condition, mark the point where Luxemburg grew from a minor influence in Arendt’s thought 
into the revolutionary figure who would appear in Men in Dark Times.  
Arendt’s extrusion of Marxism from her portrait of Luxemburg is a result of her 
categorization of the Social.  The Social is never clearly defined by Arendt, yet discussion over 
its role in Arendt’s political thought is a central feature of debates over its applicability to 
modern times. Arendt spends the most time detailing the Social in The Human Condition, a work 
that lies close to the center of her the philosophical thought. Based on an Aristotelean distinction 
between the oikos and polis, Arendt distinguishes between Labor and Work, and the category of 
Action: a category that combines politics, freedom and the public sphere. The central concepts of 
The Human Condition are further rooted in Arendt’s ontological categories of Plurality, the 
equality of human differences, and Natality, the capacity for human beginning. The result is a 
philosophical language of politics that is difficult to reconcile with many of Arendt’s politically 
realist works. For both critics and supporters of Arendt, these concepts are problematic and have 
been much debated—they have been referred to as phenomenological essentialism (Seyla 
Benhabib), ontological politics (Richard Wolin), or political existentialism (Martin Jay). Because 
of the emphasis on the ontological origins of Natality in revolution, and the centrality of 
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revolution in Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg, these concepts will be referred to as ontological 
politics in this work. The second section will analyze how Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg is 
linked to her separation of the categories of Action and the Social through the debate 
surrounding Arendt’s concept of the Social, her interpretation of Karl Marx and the resulting 
applicability of her theory of republicanism to modern political issues.   
Section three will explore the similarities between Arendt’s portrait of Rahel Varnhagen 
and that of Rosa Luxemburg. Arendt’s concepts of pariah and parvenu, presented as the only 
options for Varnhagen to attempt to navigate early modern Prussian society—as a woman and a 
Jew—will be contrasted with the political option that Arendt argues was unavailable during that 
period of history. Using this political option as a point of departure and decentering the 
conceptual language of The Human Condition, Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg can be seen as an 
avenue for rereading both thinkers from a feminist perspective. The result is the possibility of a 
politics that opens, rather than closes off, the avenues closed by Arendt’s ontological politics.  
The final section returns to Arendt’s theory of council republicanism and draws a 
distinction between Arendt’s category of Action and Luxemburg’s dialectical praxis. This 
comparison elucidates an irreconcilability between Arendt’s revolutionary heroism and 
Luxemburg’s theory of spontaneity and organization. This has important ramifications not just 
on their revolutionary theories, but to their overall images of democratic societies: Arendt’s 
idealized republicanism, modeled on the Periclean polis, is directly related to the spontaneous 
emergence of human desire for freedom. Luxemburg’s theory introduces a third element, the 
importance of organization, which through an embrace of spontaneity stemming from economic 
struggles, allows for the transfer of economic struggles into political struggles, and vice versa. 
The resulting democratic visions draw a strong contrast: Arendt constructs her idealized 
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republicanism as a bulwark against the threat that modernity can pose to a robust, public 
democracy, while Luxemburg’s socialist democracy, as a result of the dialectical 
interrelationship between economic and political struggles, seeks precisely to extend democracy 
into the untouched parts of modern life and thus fulfill its emancipatory potential. However, 
Luxemburg’s own democratic thoughts, best captured in “The Russian Revolution,” are also 
difficult to reconcile when faced with the reality of revolution. This comparative analysis points 
to the difficulties in reconciling both thinkers’ attitudes towards the relationship between 
revolution and democracy.  
  
	 12	
Section 1. The Origins of Arendt’s Portrait of Rosa Luxemburg 
In order to understand the development of Arendt’s portrait of Rosa Luxemburg, it is 
necessary to trace its emergence across her oeuvre. Beginning with earlier familial exposure to 
Luxemburg’s ideas and the influence of Luxemburg’s theory of imperialism on Origins of 
Totalitarianism, Arendt’s portrait turns towards Luxemburg’s theory of council republicanism as 
a result of the Hungarian Revolution.  Her desire to redeem Luxemburg’s legacy and her 
growing interest in council republicanism were spurred by the Hungarian Revolution, but were 
articulated through the philosophical concepts developed in The Human Condition.  This 
position would be further elaborated in On Revolution and in Arendt’s review of Peter Nettl’s 
biography of Rosa Luxemburg. 
Rosa Luxemburg was an important figure to two members of Arendt’s family: her 
mother, Martha Arendt, and her second husband, Heinrich Blücher.  Rosa Luxemburg was 
known to Arendt as a public figure from a young age. Her parents were moderate Social 
Democrats (affiliated with the reformist wing of the party of Eduard Bernstein), and, despite 
their affiliation with such socialist elements, her mother was an admirer of Rosa Luxemburg. 
Elizabeth Young-Bruehl describes how Martha Arendt took young Hannah to local Königsberg 
socialist meetings in support of the January Uprising of 1919, and “shouted to her daughter, ‘you 
must pay attention, this is a historical moment!’”14 While Arendt came from a socialist family, as 
Young-Bruehl points out, the perspective of her mother already had crossed the reformist-
revolutionary divide that Arendt would later reinterpret in Men in Dark Times.   
																																								 																				
14 Young-Bruehl, 27–28. 
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 Yet it is Arendt’s relationship to Blücher that forms the greatest direct connection to 
Luxemburg. A member of the Spartakusbund, he participated in the January Uprising and the 
early leadership struggles within the KPD. Young-Bruehl argues that the influence of the 
struggles within the KPD between supporters of Luxemburg’s legacy and Soviet-oriented leaders 
would be a major source for Arendt’s admiration of the council system: 
The decline and fall of the German Communist Party, as Blücher recounted it, provided 
Hannah Arendt with a clear image—one she never failed to refer to—of what any 
revolution cannot be without: spontaneously organized, locally based councils, or Räte, 
which are controlled neither by existing party councils—in this case, those of the Social 
Democratic party—nor by external, foreign organizations, in this case, the Moscow 
party.15 
Arendt describes the Bolshevization of the KPD with vivid language in Men in Dark Times: “the 
gutter opened, and out of it emerged what Rosa Luxemburg would have called ‘another 
zoological species.’”16 The notion that Luxemburg stood at a crossroads between her and her 
peer group’s revolutionary ambitions, and the growing threat of authoritarianism, are central to 
Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg as a revolutionary.  
Luxemburg is first mentioned in Arendt’s work in Origins of Totalitarianism. Arendt 
cites Luxemburg’s article, “Die soziale Krize in Frankenreich,” as an example of a clear analysis 
of the various (and in Arendt’s terms, farcical), attempts by monarchist and reactionary forces to 
launch a coup d’état to overthrow the republic during the Dreyfus Affair.17  More importantly, 
																																								 																				
15 Young-Bruehl, 128. 
16 Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1968), 55. 
17 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Books, 1951), 94. 
	 14	
Arendt references Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital in the section of the text dedicated 
to imperialism.18 Arendt adopts Luxemburg’s position that capitalism must always reproduce the 
original process of primitive accumulation in the non-capitalist world.19 This position allowed 
Arendt to frame imperialism as one of the root causes of the emergence of totalitarianism in 
Europe: capitalism’s need drove both the emergence of scientific racism and ambitions for  
territorial expansion by nineteenth century European powers. In Men in Dark Times, Arendt 
agrees with Lenin that Luxemburg’s theory of imperialism, as developed in Accumulation of 
Capital, was “non-Marxist.” Arendt interprets Luxemburg’s “non-orthodox” views on 
imperialism, her disagreements with other contemporary socialists such as Lenin, and her 
insistence upon a realist, rather than ideological,  analysis of society, as indications of a political 
orientation that “it might be doubted that she was a Marxist at all.”20  
In Arendt’s existing oeuvre, there is no mention of Luxemburg prior to the first 
publication of Origins in 1951. It is difficult to know for certain how and to what extent 
Blücher’s thoughts on Luxemburg influenced Arendt in the period between their meeting in 1936 
as exiles in Paris, and the first published reference to Luxemburg in Arendt’s work. Because 
Blücher was not a public writer, the role that Luxemburg had in the development of Blücher and 
Arendt’s political ideas can only be gleaned from their letters. As Arendt would later write about 
the romantic and political partnership between Luxemburg and Leo Jogiches, “we shall never 
know how many of Rosa Luxemburg’s political ideas developed from Jogiches: in marriage, it is 
not always easy to tell the partner’s thoughts apart.”21  
																																								 																				
18 Arendt, 148. 
19 Arendt, 148. 
20 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 38, 39–40. 
21 Arendt, 46. 
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It is clear that Blücher himself underwent a transformation in his own thinking on politics 
and philosophy. In a letter dated 1948 to Arendt he described his discovery of a “new territory” 
of political thought in which the philosophical “giants and the titans” were juxtaposed to a 
roughly outlined republicanism: “Kant was a servant, Nietzsche a master, Marx a despot and 
Kierkegaard a slave. And I am a prospective citizen.”22 Young-Bruehl interprets this change in 
Blücher’s thinking as concurrent to Arendt’s own interest in developing a new philosophical 
approach to politics.23 During this period Arendt produced The Human Condition and bore 
witness to the Hungarian Revolution, with its spontaneous emergence and appearance of workers 
councils. Arendt’s own turn from the bleak outlook of Origins to the more hopeful possibilities 
expressed in works produced after 1958 marks a change in the role Luxemburg played in her 
thinking.   
The Hungarian Revolution: “To the Memory of Rosa Luxemburg”  
The seemingly spontaneous emergence of the revolution in Hungary and the formation of 
councils fascinated Arendt and made Luxemburg’s ideas and participation in the 1919 uprising 
seem particularly relevant. Arendt would publish her reflections on the Hungarian Revolution in 
the same year in The Human Condition (1958). Prior to these pieces, Luxemburg was a marginal 
figure in only one of Arendt’s works. Starting with “The Hungarian Revolution and Totalitarian 
Imperialism,” Arendt would portray Luxemburg as a model revolutionary; a revolutionary who 
understood that the only goal of a revolution is freedom. Arendt’s model of Luxemburg would 
conform as much to the new political language developed in The Human Condition, as would 
																																								 																				
22 Arendt to Heinrich Blücher, July 29 1948, in Within Four Walls: The Correspondence between 
Hannah Arendt and Heinrich Blücher 1936-1968, 95. Emphasis in original. 
23 Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, 238. 
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with Luxemburg’s notion of spontaneity and commitment to democracy. Arendt articulated this 
through the framework of her ontological concept of Natality, the possibility of creating a new 
beginning, and the three categories of the Vita Activa; Labor, Work, and Action. The period of 
1956-1958 thus marks a major change in Arendt’s conception of Luxemburg; a change that 
occurred as part of Arendt’s development of the philosophical language in The Human 
Condition.  
Arendt’s reflection on the Hungarian Revolution marks a turn from the bleak portrayal of 
totalitarianism in Origins to the possibility of hope that regular people can resist oppression and 
spontaneously organize councils that are “the only alternative for a democratic government in the 
modern age.”24 Arendt writes: 
If there was ever such a thing as Rosa Luxemburg’s “spontaneous revolution,” this 
sudden uprising of an entire people for the sake of freedom and nothing else—
spontaneous, and without the demoralizing chaos of a military defeat preceding it, 
without coup d’état techniques, without a closely knit apparatus of professional 
conspirators and revolutionaries, without even a leadership of a party, something that 
everyone, conservatives and liberals, radicals and revolutionaries, have discarded as a 
noble dream—it was then we had the privilege of witnessing it.25   
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The emergence of councils in the modern era, the era of the decline of democratic principles and 
the rise of totalitarianism, signified to Arendt that the hope of democracy persevered. According 
to Arendt and Blücher, Luxemburg stood at the first such moment in the modern era during the 
January Uprising in 1919. As Blücher wrote to Arendt after she had been compared to Rosa 
Luxemburg at a lecture in Germany in 1958, with the publisher of the German Edition of “The 
Hungarian Revolution,” Klaus Piper, in attendance: “I am very pleased that the Ungarische 
Revolution is coming out in Germany. If the young there have any inkling about Rosa 
Luxemburg, then it will do them good to be confronted by this first attempt to show what 
practical methods all obsolete powers use to exert political control over free people through 
fear.”26  
 The first draft of the German Edition of “The Hungarian Revolution” contained a 
dedication to Rosa Luxemburg, which simply read “to the memory of Rosa Luxemburg.”27 Klaus 
Piper, of R. Piper & co., had reservations about the dedication, and wrote to Arendt that  
This pamphlet is a passionate appeal on the essence and danger of totalitarian 
imperialism; concretely, to recognize correctly the communist regimes of violence. But 
this same pamphlet is dedicated to the woman who, according to the usual imagination of 
all that do not know, is to be counted among the pioneers of the same communism in 
Germany.28  
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Piper proposed the dedication: “to the memory of the liberal socialist Rosa Luxemburg, who did 
not want totalitarian communism.”29 Arendt, however, decided not to include the dedication and 
responded: 
If we have to explain in black and white what we mean, we must cut the dedication. Poor 
Rosa! She has been dead now for forty years, and still falls between all stools. Of course, 
I understand your reasons. I only ventured to do so in the first place because I was struck 
by the audience’s reaction at my lecture, which also came as quite a surprise to you. 
Perhaps the young people—and they were the only ones clapping!—know better again; 
For we agreed on the fact that they cannot all have been communists—who would have 
been the people not clapping! The dedication cannot be rephrased, because one would 
have to explain that Luxemburg was neither really a socialist nor a communist, but ‘only’ 
stood for justice and freedom and revolution as the only possibility for a new form of 
society and state.30 
In her letter to Piper, Arendt indicates a desire to redeem Luxemburg’s legacy. After Arendt was 
compared to Luxemburg (“it seems invariably has to happen,” she wrote) during her summer 
1958 talk in Munich, she wrote to Blücher that “I was very honored to have my name and Rosa 
Luxemburg’s mentioned in the same breath. At that the whippersnappers in the auditorium broke 
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into spontaneous applause! But tell me please, where do they know her from? You can’t find a 
single book of hers in the bookstores. Piper, e.g., barely knew anything.”31  
Ursula Ludz has written extensively on this period of Arendt’s archival materials within 
German language scholarship. Arendt’s association with Piper was centered on writing an 
“introduction to politics,” along the same lines as Karl Jasper’s (one of two sources of 
existentialist philosophy (existenzphilosphie) from Arendt’s past; the other being Martin 
Heidegger), recently published “introduction to philosophy.” Arendt wrote to Piper that she did 
not want the piece to be a work of “politics as science” (Politik als Wissenschaft) but instead as 
an exploration of the relationship between the Political and human existence (menschlichen 
Dasein).32 As Ludz notes, because of lecture engagements (such as that in Munich) and travel, 
Arendt was not able to complete the introduction. However, it is indicative of the ways in which 
Arendt was perceiving political questions while she wrote The Human Condition, “The 
Hungarian Revolution,” and began to develop the core of her portrait of Luxemburg. The 
relationship between the philosophical concepts developed in this period, particularly the 
concepts related to the relationship between existenzphilosophie and politics, will be further 
explored in section two.  
The legacy that Arendt wishes to resurrect is the idea of Luxemburg as a very particular 
kind of revolutionary—one who sought freedom and nothing else. “The Hungarian Revolution” 
marks the first point where Arendt explicitly erases Marxism from Luxemburg’s thinking. Both 
in the text and in her letter to Piper, Arendt describes Luxemburg as interested only in freedom, a 
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definition of a genuine revolutionary whom Arendt would later write about in On Revolution. 
The reason why Luxemburg was “neither really a socialist nor a communist” is unclear in the 
text; there are indications of why, in the philosophical concepts that Arendt wrote about in The 
Human Condition. The separation of economic from political concerns in the three categories of 
the Vita Activa, Labor, Work and Action, that Arendt describes in The Human Condition is 
replicated in the purely political goals and aspirations of Luxemburg and the worker’s councils 
which spontaneously emerged in Hungary. Yet already the separation between economic and 
political issues emerged in “The Hungarian Revolution.” As Arendt writes, “it is quite doubtful 
whether the political principles of equality and self-rule can readily be applied to the economic 
sphere.”33 Section two will address the role that the concepts developed in The Human Condition 
played in Arendt’s further understanding of Luxemburg’s own ideas and political goals.  
On Revolution expands upon Arendt’s claims in “The Hungarian Revolution” that the 
goal of all revolutions is freedom and the “lost treasure” of all modern revolutions since the 
French Revolution, is what Arendt calls “the council system.” Arendt reiterates Luxemburg’s 
role as an observer who “pointed out with such amazing clearsightedness” the gulf between the 
aspirations of professional revolutionaries with their “ready-made formulas” and the spontaneous 
emergence of councils.34 In On Revolution, Arendt is concerned with linking the revolutionary 
drive for freedom with “the possibility of founding a permanent, lasting, enduring body 
politic.”35 Arendt argues that the initial urge for freedom, the revolutionary spirit, the 
spontaneous emergence of councils as a plural act aiming for freedom, must be incorporated into 
a new political formation. Arendt argues that Thomas Jefferson, with his support for 
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incorporating the local ward system into the constitutional republic, reflected the possibility of 
capturing the revolutionary spirit in a new political state.36 
On Revolution centers on the distinction between revolutionaries and the spontaneous 
origins of revolution itself. By distinguishing between the actions of “professional” 
revolutionaries from the spontaneous origin of revolutions, Arendt aimed to show that no 
revolutionary caused a revolution via his or her own actions.  On Revolution is a piece that relies 
upon distinctions drawn within the modern history of revolutions to extract “the lost treasure” of 
the revolutionary tradition: the council system. Arendt argued that the spontaneous emergence of 
councils in a variety of revolutionary moments is the manifestation of the drive for freedom, 
which lies the core of humanity’s capacity for political action. The importance of spontaneity, 
from the French Revolution to the Hungarian, is central to Arendt’s understanding of the 
ontological origins of revolutionary political action, or Natality,  because no revolutionary actor 
could account for the “emergence and reemergence of the council system ever since the French 
Revolution.”37 The “lack of continuity” between the emergence of councils is clear evidence to 
Arendt of the “spontaneity of their coming into being.”38  
Throughout On Revolution, revolutionaries find themselves surprised by, or discovering, 
the reemergence of councils.  For example, Arendt describes the signatories of the Mayflower 
Compact as able to “discover, almost by inadvertence, the elementary grammar of political 
action and its more complicated syntax, whose rules determine the rise and fall of human 
power… what they discovered, to be sure, was no theory of social contract in either of its two 
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forms, but rather the few elementary truths on which this theory rests”39 Arendt argues, that 
Jefferson knew that freedom must have an institutional home in the new republic, yet he knew it 
“however dimly.”40 Arendt’s reading of these revolutionary figures does not require that they are 
philosophically aware of the elementary language of politics. In fact, because this language is 
ontological, she reads Jefferson and Luxemburg’s commitment to spontaneous emergence of 
revolutions and councils as an awareness, however “dim,” of the ontological origins of their 
thought.  Thus one could say of Arendt’s interpretation of “the Russian Revolution,” what she 
would later write of Jefferson and the American Revolution: 
Still, though this was a new freedom they were aiming at, it would be hard to maintain 
they had no prior notion of it. On the contrary, it was a passion for this new political 
freedom, though not yet equated with a republican form of government, which inspired 
and prepared those to enact a revolution without fully knowing what they were doing.41  
Arendt thus inverts the traditional Marxist understanding of bourgeois and proletarian 
revolutions, based upon her understanding of the goal of revolution being freedom and the 
emergence councils as indicators of a genuine revolution. Instead, she draws the line between 
those professional revolutionaries who tried to create social revolutions and thus created new 
forms of oppression, such as Robespierre and Lenin, and those who understood, however dimly, 
that revolution emerges from the spontaneous actions of people, such as Luxemburg and 
Jefferson. As Arendt portrayed in On Revolution, the differences are parallel to Robespierre’s 
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“despotism of liberty” and Condorcet’s observation that “the word ‘revolutionary’ can be applied 
only to revolutions whose aim is freedom.”42 
Luxemburg and Jefferson are an atypical pairing. What draws these revolutionaries 
together in Arendt’s work is not political ideology, but instead their understanding of the 
spontaneous emergence of freedom within councils and their attempts to encapsulate the councils 
into the creation of new, durable republics (Jefferson’s Ward System, Luxemburg’s Räte during 
the German Revolution). In On Revolution, in an argument that mirrors Rosa Luxemburg’s 
critique of Lenin in “The Russian Revolution”, Arendt states that an entirely new form of 
government can be created by channeling the “spirit of revolution” through republican 
institutions. As Luxemburg wrote on the importance of maintaining democratic institutions, “the 
living fluid of the popular mood continuously flows around the representative bodies, penetrates 
them, guides them.”43 There is a similarity between Luxemburg’s “popular mood” and Arendt’s 
“revolutionary spirit.” As Arendt would write, council republicanism could ensure that the 
revolutionary spirit is captured “for political freedom, generally speaking, means the right ‘to be 
the participator in government,’ or it means nothing.”44 The difference between their 
revolutionary theories and the role that the organization plays meant that Luxemburg and Arendt 
had divergent views on revolutionary strategy, as well as on the nature of democratic politics that 
they envisioned would be nourished by the energy of a revolutionary struggle. Section four will 
further explore this difference.  
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In 1966, Arendt got her chance to engage in Luxemburg’s legacy in her review of Peter 
Nettl’s biography of Rosa Luxemburg. Arendt’s essay in Men in Dark Times was originally 
published as “A Heroine of Revolution,” in The New York Review of the Books in that year. It 
was a synthesis of the previous threads of Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg. The personal 
affinities between Arendt and Luxemburg emerge several times in the piece, both in the much 
referenced comparison between the relationships of Arendt and Blücher, and of Luxemburg and 
Jogiches, and in Arendt’s own willingness to speculate on the thoughts and motivations of 
Luxemburg.45  
In the NYRB review, Arendt described Nettl as “practically unknown.”46  In a letter to 
Arendt, Robert Silvers, editor of the NYRB, told Arendt that he did not know much about him, 
but that he lectured at the University of Leeds and had been a successful private businessman.47 
This last fact intrigued Arendt greatly, enough that she mentioned it in a letter to Karl Jaspers, 
writing “and the man who wrote the book, Nettl, completely unknown. Rumor has it that he’s a 
businessman!—as if he were [Luxemburg’s] last suitor.”48 Nettl was precisely the kind of “out of 
step” persona to whom Arendt was drawn. Nettl was born in the Sudetenland in 1926 to a family 
involved in the fur industry.49 He studied at Oxford after his family relocated to the UK, and was 
a successful fur trader until 1961, when he left to pursue an academic career at the University of 
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Leeds.50 His career was cut tragically short when he was killed in a plane crash in 1968.51 
Arendt’s review was republished in a compilation of essays in honor of his memory. The editor, 
A. H. Hanson, compared Nettl to Luxemburg by writing that Nettl was “Jewish, central 
European, cosmopolitan, bold, intellectually adventurous and with a contempt for 
mediocrity…he also shared with his subject an artistic sensitivity, a personal fastidiousness, and 
an anxiety to the keep the personal life in a separate compartment from the public. The result of 
this meeting of minds across the years is a portrait of unusual depth and intimacy.”52  
In addition to his biography, Arendt also read Nettl’s essay “The German Social 
Democratic Party 1890-1914 as a Political Model,” in which he outlined the curious “pariah 
position” that the party came to play in Imperial German political society.53 The role of the 
internal political struggles within the SPD and its “betrayal” in supporting the First World War 
play a central role in Arendt’s essay. While she was writing her review, Arendt read Eduard 
Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, and developed an idiosyncratic interpretation of the role the two 
played in Luxemburg’s personal and political trajectory. While writing the piece, she reported to 
Jaspers that Bernstein was “a very intelligent man. But what a repulsive hypocrite Kautsky 
was.”54 As with her understanding of revolutionaries in On Revolution, Arendt judges the major 
figures of the SPD on the terms of categories like Action from the Vita Activa.  Arendt’s distaste 
for Kautsky comes from her articulation of the classic debate between reform and revolution as 
one of action and inaction within society. Arendt understands Kautsky’s commitment to 
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revolution, against Bernstein’s revisionism, as justification for inaction and the continuation 
along the path of a “state within a state.”55  In contrast, despite Luxemburg’s passionate attacks 
on Bernstein’s “reformist” position, Arendt writes “Bernstein and Rosa Luxemburg…had in 
common that they were both honest (which may explain Bernstein’s ‘secret tenderness’ for her), 
analyzed what they saw, were loyal to reality and critical of Marx.”56  
Arendt, by reframing the debate within German socialism as one between inaction and 
action, whether reformist, electoral or revolutionary, misses the nuance of Luxemburg’s 
interparty political maneuvering. Luxemburg opposed both Bernstein’s reformism and Kautsky’s 
theoretical rigidity and inaction, in accordance with her belief in political struggle as a method of 
raising class consciousness amongst workers. The result of Kautsky’s strategy, while paying lip 
service to revolutionary strategy, amounted to inaction. As a result, Kautsky’s position was 
revolutionary in theory, but amounted to reformism in practice.57 This hypocritical position is 
almost certainly the source of Arendt’s hostility towards Kautsky.  
It is this separation of action from inaction that Arendt utilizes to articulate Luxemburg’s 
perceived republican program. Arendt also claims that “it is indeed the republican question rather 
than the national one which separated her most decisively from all others.”58 Yet, as Leszek 
Kolakowski notes, republicanism was the program of the vast majority of the Marxist socialists 
in the Second International, because “a bourgeois republic could not itself carry out the socialist 
programme, but it provided better conditions for the proletariat to carry on the fight.”59 Arendt 
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portrays Luxemburg’s post-1910 “strategy of friction” as an attempt to escape the SPD’s “pariah 
position” of inaction and to preserve the revolutionary spirit. Arendt argued that Luxemburg “did 
not intend to spend her life in a sect” and that “her commitment to revolution was primarily a 
moral matter, and this meant that she remained passionately engaged in public life and civil 
affairs, in the destinies of the world.”60  
The emergence of Luxemburg’s moral concern with revolution is the only major new 
aspect of Luxemburg’s portrait provided by Arendt in Men in Dark Times. In another example of 
Arendt’s inference of Luxemburg’s personal motivations, she cites the source of Luxemburg’s 
moral commitment in the “moral taste” she shared with her Polish-Jewish peer group from the 
Social Democrats of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL). Arendt writes of this 
“moral taste, which is so different from ‘moral principles’; the authenticity of their morality they 
owed to having grown up in a world that was not out of joint.”61 Margaret Canovan identifies the 
relationship between private morality and public political action as a unique feature of Arendt’s 
understanding of the motivating strength and limitation of political principles. While these 
principles can be contradictory or even lead to terrible political conclusions, for Arendt, private 
morality could act as a compass through which right political action could be navigated. Morality 
can thus be used to decide private actions, but: 
There is also political action, which is distinguished from private action not by lack of 
principles, not necessarily even being inspired by different principles (since loyalty, for 
example, could inspire both), but simply by the direction of moral commitment; by being 
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directed to the public world, like Rosa Luxemburg’s or Lincoln’s, rather than to personal 
relations like Antigone’s.62  
For Arendt it is the personal morality of Luxemburg and her peer group, directed outward from 
the private to the public realm, that acts as a kind of compass towards right action. The 
distinctions between private/public and social/political begin to blur in the same manner as the 
personal and theoretical aspects of Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg.  The role of Luxemburg’s 
personal life in Arendt’s portrait is to identify the sources of private moral commitment and the 
manner in which it is transformed into a public, political commitment. It is to this moral 
commitment that Arendt ascribes Luxemburg’s political motivations, rather than a commitment 
to a Marxist theoretical understanding. The role of this movement from private to public life will 
be explored further in section three.  
Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg is strongest in the areas where she describes 
Luxemburg’s commitment to spontaneity and public freedom. Arendt recounts both 
Luxemburg’s experience witnessing the Soviets during the Revolution of 1905, and her debate 
with Lenin during the Revolution of 1917. Arendt draws the connection between spontaneity and 
the importance of “the school of public life itself, the most unlimited, the broadest democracy 
and public opinion.”63 There is an affinity between Arendt’s theory of Natality/public freedom 
and Luxemburg’s theory of spontaneity. Arendt’s idea of the spontaneous emergence of councils 
and the importance of capturing the “revolutionary spirit” in a post-revolutionary political 
organization is similar to Luxemburg’s belief in the importance of the spontaneous possibilities 
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of the masses and of the necessity to channel “the living fluid of the popular mood” through 
political institutions.64 Yet even these similar political concepts are impacted by Arendt’s 
framing of her political ideas through the strict separation between the categories of the Political 
and the Social. Section two will focus on the ways in which Arendt’s philosophical foundations 
to her political theories impact her understanding of Luxemburg.  
It is important to hesitate before referring to a unified Luxemburgian theory of revolution 
and socialist democracy. As Martin Jay rightly points out, Luxemburg never succeeded in 
unifying her economic analysis and her theory of spontaneity.65  Her brutal murder meant that the 
pieces of her thoughts on revolution and democracy, written during the events often in shorter, 
less theoretical pieces, mean that her legacy has been open and greatly contested. The 
construction of “Luxemburgisms” is entwined with the creation of her legacy. The openness of 
her theoretical writings, her untimely death and her position as both a supporter and critic of the 
Bolsheviks, as well as her murder that was blamed directly on the ascendant SPD, led to a legacy 
too often tied to the internal battles of both the socialist and communist movements of the 
twentieth century.66 
Luxemburgism itself was a creation of the conflicts in the KPD and in the early years of 
the socialist revolution. Georg Lukács’ essays on Luxemburg in History and Class 
Consciousness (1923) were the first attempt to craft a unified Luxemburgian theory. As Nettl 
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observed, this was in direct relation to the problem posed by the public emergence of “The 
Russian Revolution” in 1922 and the need to categorize Luxemburg in the newly dividing 
factions of international socialism.67 The result was the creation of Luxemburgism as a 
revolutionary precursor to Leninism—correct in its revolutionary orientation, but wrong on the 
issues of the dictatorship of the proletariat. A second version of Luxemburgism emerged during 
the political struggles of the early KPD in which Blücher took part. Luxemburgism as an “Ultra 
Left” deviation, which Nettl described as “what Trotskyism was to Stalin in Russia, 
Luxemburgism became for the Stalinists or Bolshevizers in Germany: the local version of 
Trotskyite indiscipline and error.”68 Arendt responded to this version of Luxemburgism by 
seeking to extract Luxemburg from the image of Luxemburgism created by socialist and 
communist infighting and to valorize those very traits that the official communist line had 
denigrated: her critique of Lenin, faith in democracy and commitment to revolutionary 
spontaneity. Thus it may be possible to articulate Arendt’s interpretation of Luxemburg as a kind 
of counter-interpretation to the Soviet aligned version.   
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Section 2. Rosa Luxemburg and Existenzphilosophie: The Human Condition, the Social, and 
Modernity 
The reception of Arendt’s political theory has been marked by critics who see a 
difference between her abstract philosophical language and idealized image of a Periclean, polis 
in The Human Condition, and Arendt’s other works that display a commitment to political 
realism.69 The concept of the Social in particular, has troubled theorists trying to adapt Arendt’s 
work to the reality of modern politics. In The Blob, Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social, 
Hannah Pitkin uses the metaphor of a “blob” to describe a category that Arendt filled with all the 
conditions of modern life which she felt threatened the idealized political structures developed in 
The Human Condition. The “monstrous” nature of the Social is such that any attempt to grasp 
Arendt’s political philosophy as a whole will either have to reckon with untangling the knot of 
the Social, or bypassing it entirely. The problem, that the concepts in The Human Condition are 
ontological in nature, implies that the work is the foundational language of politics. With this 
understanding, Arendt describes politics in her other more politically realist works. As a result of 
this and the anti-modern implications of the Social, theorists have been divided on the 
applicability of Arendt’s political thought to the modern era. Critical responses to Arendt’s 
theory, such as those from Martin Jay and Richard Wolin, focus on the ontological and 
existential basis of Arendt’s political thought, rooted in Aristotelean concepts and 
existenzphilosophie inherited from Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers. In contrast, those 
sympathetic to Arendt’s approach, such as Seyla Benhabib, identify avenues through which 
Arendt’s work is applicable to the modern world by decentering The Human Condition from her 
thinking. Arendt’s interpretation of the Social and theory of Action underscores her portrait of 
																																								 																				
69 Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, 237. 
	 32	
Luxemburg. Arendt presents her concept of the Social as central to her critique of Marx in The 
Human Condition.  
 The ontological political concepts presented in The Human Condition, the Vita Activa, 
Arendt’s critique of Marx and, most importantly, the contrast that Arendt articulates between the 
categories of the Political and the Social, are central to understanding her portrait of Luxemburg. 
For example, in On Revolution, Natality, the capacity that humanity possesses to create an 
entirely new beginning, is connected to Arendt’s understanding that “only where this pathos of 
novelty is present and where novelty is connected with the idea of freedom are we entitled to 
speak of revolution.”70 Natality, first introduced in The Human Condition, is thus the ontological 
basis of Arendt’s understanding of revolution.    
 The Social is a concept that is much debated by scholars of Arendt. In Hannah Pitkin’s 
detailed study, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social, she analyzes the 
various ways that Arendt described the Social; Arendt never gave a clear definition, but 
articulated the Social as an ever growing threat in the modern world against three concepts, 
which Pitkin argues Arendt “treated as almost synonymous: ‘action,’ politics,’ and ‘freedom.’”71 
Pitkin identifies several potential meanings of the Social, from the separation of politics and 
economics, to tyrannical forms of government including totalitarianism, and the decline of 
human agency in the modern world. Yet against all forms of the Social, Arendt juxtaposed a 
democratic ideal, modeled roughly on an idealized Greek polis and based on her ontological 
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concepts of Natality, Plurality, and Action.72 Arendt’s theory of council republicanism, and thus 
her portrait of Luxemburg, rests upon a foundation of these concepts.  
The Human Condition is primarily a work of philosophy, an attempt to rethink the 
philosophical origins of politics. As such, the influence of existenzphilosophie via Heidegger and 
Jaspers, and classical Aristotelian political theory are essential to understanding the ontological 
conceptual language and articulation of ideas in The Human Condition. In contrast to 
Heidegger’s view that human phenomenological existence (being-in-the-world) is individual, 
Arendt framed human existence as plural—influenced by Karl Jaspers’ thought on 
communication— and claims: “existence itself is, by its very nature, never isolated. It exists only 
in communication and in awareness of other’s existence…existence can develop only in the 
shared life of human beings inhabiting a given world common to them all.”73 This 
phenomenological category of plurality is an equality of sameness and difference since each 
person has their own unique individuality.74 From plurality, Arendt then interpreted Aristotelian 
ethics and politics to differentiate the various aspects of human private and public life in The 
Human Condition. Aristotle’s influence in how he “distinguished three ways of life (bioi) which 
men might choose freedom” as Arendt’s Vita Activa.75 Arendt describes the three conditions of 
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the Vita Activa as Labor, Work, and Action. Action, which takes place in the polis (the public 
realm) arises from Natality and Plurality.76 In contrast to Labor and Work, Action:  
has the closest connection with the human condition of natality; the new beginning 
inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses 
the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting.77 
Labor is the category of the animal laborans, the physical labor humans must engage in to 
survive, while work is the realm of homo faber and represents the construction of the man-made 
objects by which humans make the world which they inhabit.78 The Social emerges from 
modernity as the growth of Labor and Work, a “curiously hybrid realm” of private and public, 
that increasingly threatens politics.79 Through a strict separation between the categories of the 
human condition, Arendt separates the political and public realm from that of the economy and 
the Social—a view that reflected the Aristotelean division between the oikos (private household 
space) and the polis (public space of politics).80  
 Action encompasses the human capacity to create new political worlds, the ontological 
root of direct democracy in human plurality, the polis as a model for institutionalizing the spark 
of freedom, and the space for the immortalization of human words and deeds through political 
action. In short, it is equally as broad a category as the Social. What further distinguishes the 
political aspects of Action from the Social is a question of agency—Action implies those areas in 
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which the ontological conditions of Plurality and Natality can be expressed. Arendt argues that 
while Labor, Work and Action are all political in nature, only Action is “specifically the 
condition” of politics.81 The Social, in contrast, generates human impotence.  
Beyond a distinction between economics and politics, the Social encompasses the spread 
of social conformity, a kind of closeness that eliminates the distance necessary for the expression 
individual human uniqueness, the result of plurality: “from the viewpoint of the world and the 
public realm, life and death and everything attesting to sameness are non-wordly, antipolitical, 
truly transcendent experiences.”82 Arendt draws a distinction between the kind of equality 
present in plurality—a “togetherness” that takes place in democratic public spheres—and that 
which is a creation of the rise of the social—“this unitedness of many into one”—a  result of 
projects not dedicated to the creation of exclusively political, public spaces.83   
 Connecting the arguments of Origins of Totalitarianism to the new language of The 
Human Condition, Arendt argues that tyrannical forms of government, in which a distance 
between people shrinks, violate the ontological condition of plurality “which is the condition of 
all forms of political organization.”84 As result, the space where freedom is possible is eliminated 
by the shrinking “iron band” of totalitarian terror.85 In contrast to the institutions of democratic 
governance that generate political power through public participation, Tyranny 
“generates…impotence as naturally as other bodies politic generate power.”86 The Social is a 
force that wears down the ontological conditions of human action, which is the raison d’être of 
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politics. In On Revolution, this is the “lost treasure” of revolution, the rediscovered human 
capacity for newness and freedom which is the very core of politics.  
 Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg corresponds to the opposition between the Social and the 
category of Action. The portrait thus reflects Arendt’s categorization of the Vita Activa and her 
ontological politics. At times, this creates a fascinating dialogue wherein Luxemburg and 
Arendt’s commitment to political action and the spontaneous revolutionary actions of ordinary 
people can illuminate questions of revolution, democracy and public freedom in the modern era. 
At other moments, the murky nature of the Social, and her reliance upon a form of traditional 
republicanism, replicate the problems of the Social in her portrait and shoehorn Luxemburg into 
a role that strays far from the realities of socialist politics in the era of the Second International. 
This is particularly true in Arendt’s articulation of Luxemburg as revolutionary heroine in the 
mold of the idealized Periclean heroism of Athenian democracy presented in The Human 
Condition, which Arendt proposes as the model for council republicanism in the modern world. 
The most extreme example of the influence of Arendt’s ontological politics on her portrait of 
Luxemburg is the extrusion of Marxism and any Marxist ideological motivations from 
Luxemburg’s politics.  
Animal Laborans and Arendt’s Interpretation of Marxism  
 For the purposes of understanding Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg, an understanding of 
Marx’s relationship to the Social explains Arendt’s extrusion of Marxist influence from the 
socialist revolutionary. Arendt’s critique of Marx is based on her understanding of the distinction 
between Labor/Work and Action. Arendt argued that Marx’s understanding of the capitalist 
world, the world in which labor first appeared in public, in fact reinforced capitalism’s 
valorization of labor. Following her Aristotelean separation of the polis and oikos, Arendt 
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described labor as the simple maintenance of human physical necessities. The encroachment of 
the Social in the modern world is driven by capitalism’s raising of labor to the public realm, 
which, according to Arendt is the realm of Action and politics alone. The rise of labor and the 
Social are linked together, as Arendt writes “the social viewpoint is identical…with an 
interpretation that takes nothing into account but the life process of mankind, and within its 
frame of reference all things become objects of consumption.”87 Classical political economy 
emerged during this rise of labor/the Social and  
From this purely social viewpoint, which is the viewpoint of the whole modern age but 
which received its most coherent and greatest expression in Marx’s work, all laboring is 
‘productive,’ and the earlier distinction between the performance of ‘menial tasks’ that 
leave no trace and the production of things durable enough to be accumulated loses its 
validity.88 
According to Arendt, Marx’s mistake was to assume that labor was the political terrain upon 
which freedom could be won by releasing “socialized” animal laborans from toil, “so that if it is 
not spent and exhausted in the drudgery of life it will automatically nourish other, ‘higher,’ 
activities.”89 However, the Social, with its deleterious effects on human life, reduces the full 
human capacities which are reflected in the realm of Action and politics to the state of animal 
laborans, for whom this free time is never spent on anything but consumption.”90 Arendt argues 
that Marx conflated Labor with Work, the latter of which is the realm of homo faber and is more 
closely related to Action as the creation of space in which politics are possible. Thus Arendt 
																																								 																				
87 Arendt, 89. 
88 Arendt, 88–89. 
89 Arendt, 133. 
90 Arendt, 133. 
	 38	
contrasts the higher planes of work and action in politics—the creation of a public sphere which 
is linked ontologically to the human capacity for freedom—from “socialized mankind” which “is 
the unfortunately quite unutopian ideal that guides Marx’s theories.”91  
 Arendt’s impression of Marx is split between “Marx the revolutionary” and “Marx the 
political economist.” At times, Arendt expresses admiration for Marx’s revolutionary passion 
and his attention to empirical detail. As Pitkin argues, Arendt’s criticism of Marx, which focuses 
on economic and social issues, reflects a more hidden influence.92 Pitkin speculates that if Arendt 
were able to expand upon this and other similarities between her own thinking and Marx’s (such 
as a similarities between the world-alienation of the Social and Marx’s theory of alienation), a 
much more productive dialogue on freedom, politics and labor could be opened: “she might, in 
short, have insisted on the need to teach people explicitly about action, politics, the lost treasure, 
might even have counterposed Tocqueville to Marx for this purpose and attempted a synthesis of 
their ideas.” While Arendt describes the Social as a problem of the growth of “laboring society” 
at the expense of politics, she also imagines it as an alienating force that renders people impotent 
and unable to change their political circumstances.   
 In The Human Condition, Arendt draws a distinction between the “economic” and 
“political” aspects of the labor movement. However, rather than a typical understanding of trade 
unionism and socialist political parties, Arendt interprets this split as one based on the separation 
of politics and the Social: “the people’s political aspirations” are contrasted with trade unionism, 
which itself was a product of the rise of animal laborans. Arendt describes how two aspects of 
labor emerged in two moments of revolution:  
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A distinction appeared only in those rare and yet decisive moments when during the 
process of a revolution it suddenly turned out that these people, if not led by the 
possibilities of democratic government under modern conditions, had their own ideas 
about the possibilities of democratic government under modern conditions. In other 
words, the dividing line between the two is not a matter of extreme social and economic 
demands but solely of the proposition of a new form of government.93 
Most importantly, Arendt draws a firm line between the people’s aspirations in the movement 
and party programs and economic interests. In another indication of Arendt’s concerns over the 
strength of the rise of the Social, she writes:  
The historical destinies of the two trends in the working class, the trade-union movement, 
the people’s political aspirations, could not be more at variance: the trade unions, that is, 
the working class in so far as it is but one of the classes of modern society, have gone 
from victory to victory, while at the same time the political labor movement has been 
defeated each time it dared to put forth its own demands, as distinguished from party 
programs and economic reforms.94 
Arendt’s understanding of the two-fold nature of working class action is a reflection of the 
understanding of the Social. While Arendt frames trade-unionism as successful in the economic 
realm, she relates the difficulties in transforming those economic actions into real political 
results.  Is this another possible similarity between Arendt and Luxemburg’s understandings of 
the relationship between political and economic struggles? Certainly if one were to take 
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Luxemburg’s long clash with the reformism of Eduard Bernstein, then the similarities in their 
positions are very clear:  
In thus making the abandonment of the socialist labor movement an essential condition 
and a social presupposition for the preservation of bourgeois democracy today, 
[Bernstein] proves in a striking manner that this democracy is in complete contradiction 
with the development of modern society. At the same time, he proves that the socialist 
labor movement is itself a direct product of this tendency.95 
Luxemburg chastises Bernstein for forcing the socialist trade unions to abandon their 
revolutionary political goals in favor of gaining legitimacy inside the very political regime that 
caused their necessary creation in the first place. Arendt’s own articulation of the reform versus 
revolution debate is quite different.  
In Men in Dark Times, Arendt praises Bernstein for his appraisal of the political reality of 
the SPD and connects this with her interpretation of Luxemburg’s own critical approach to 
Marxism. Arendt harshly critiques Karl Kautsky’s devotion to Marxist theoretical orthodoxy and 
perpetuation of the “pariah position” of the SPD.96 By doing so, Kautsky denies the necessity of 
political action, relying upon his theoretical understanding of the growth and downfall of 
capitalism, all of which is a product of the rise of the Social. In Arendt’s understanding, political 
action is necessary to escape from this very reality which would result in the bureaucratization of 
society and the degradation of human freedom. It is difficult to reconcile exactly why Bernstein’s 
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commitment to Action, reformism and trade union strategies is something that fits Arendt’s 
criteria for political action except insofar as it differs from Kautsky’s strategy of political 
inaction.  
 Thus the role of the Social is crucial in Arendt’s extrusion of Marxism from her portrait 
of Luxemburg, and in her interpretation of the party life within which Luxemburg’s political 
thought developed. Arendt articulated an image of Luxemburg based on her own concept of 
Action and corresponding notion of a genuine revolutionary. Arendt separated revolutionaries by 
their commitments to political freedom and their understanding of the source of freedom in the 
spontaneous actions of people. Jefferson and Luxemburg are linked as republican revolutionaries 
in contrast to Robespierre and Lenin, not because they are ideologically similar, but because their 
commitment to public freedom is more central to Arendt’s understanding of what constitutes 
politics than their more “ideologically” committed contemporaries. Arendt interprets 
Luxemburg’s critique of Lenin in “The Russian Revolution,” not as a debate amongst Second 
International socialist revolutionaries, but as a more fundamental philosophical distinction 
between political freedom and the deleterious effects of the Social that would arise in the 
twentieth century. Arendt’s concerns about the rise of the Social are similar to Luxemburg’s 
regarding the rise of bureaucracy and party apparatchiks in the Soviet Union. This version of 
Rosa Luxemburg fits most neatly Arendt’s larger philosophical project as explicated in The 
Human Condition. Luxemburg’s defense of political institutions as the conduits for channeling 
the political energy of the masses into the new post-revolutionary political institutions is very 
similar to Arendt’s own ideas regarding the relationship of human plurality and the category of 
Action in The Human Condition and on the revolutionary spirit in On Revolution.  
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 Any synthesis of Arendt’s commitment to classical republicanism and Luxemburg’s 
socialism is made difficult by Arendt’s ontological political concepts. By incorporating socialism 
into the realm of politics, Arendt would be conceding the elevated position that her 
republicanism has to all other political ideologies, which are merely products of the Social. 
Reconciling her republicanism with Marxism would further place Arendt’s theories into the 
scope of an historical moment, while her ontological politics are explicitly trans-historical: 
because of Natality, the impulse for freedom emerges spontaneously again and again without 
continuity. The rise of the Social is an historical phenomenon, freedom is ontological. Lastly, 
because the Social is explicitly juxtaposed to Action, where the Social is anti-political and 
Action is the category of politics, Arendt’s philosophy not only stands in the way of a synthesis 
of democracy and socialism, but would also result in socialism undermining the very conditions 
of politics itself.  
The Political and Arendt’s Relationship to Modernity     
 The relationship between the concepts developed in The Human Condition and real, 
modern historical events is a source of debate over Arendt’s relationship to modernity. Arendt’s 
concept of the Social is explicitly linked to a variety of social, economic and political conditions 
of the modern world. The ontological language deployed in The Human Condition stands in stark 
contrast to Arendt’s other works on specific historical events, such as On Revolution, or her 
various essays which cover contemporary events such as the Hungarian Revolution or the 
reflections on Watergate in “Lying in Politics (1972).” The contrast between Arendt’s 
republicanism in The Human Condition and the threats implicit in modernity is particularly 
increased by Arendt’s support of “heroism,” “greatness,” and “immortality.” The latter can be 
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won in the public arena, while the Social threatens to flatten people into mediocrity (mere animal 
laborans).   
In Permanent Exiles, Martin Jay argues that the categories of The Human Condition, 
indebted to existenzphilosophie via Heidegger and Jaspers, bear striking similarities to the 
theories of the political existentialists of 1920’s Germany, such as Carl Schmitt and Ernst Jünger. 
While opposing their political convictions and ideas (such a comparison is exceptionally fraught 
with tension because of the political existentialists’ role in presaging the rise of fascism), Jay 
argues that Arendt shared the basic conviction of the autonomy of the political realm from the 
rest of society: “thus, she saw politics not merely as irreducible to socioeconomic forces, but also 
as unhampered by all normative or instrumental constraints as well, a position often known as 
‘decisionism.’ As its own end, politics should not be conceived as a means to anything else 
whether it be domination, wealth, public welfare, or social justice: in short, politique pour 
politique.”97 Jay also argues that Arendt shares the political existentialist rejection of history as a 
source of political action or legitimacy, in favor of individual political action that is able to 
escape its constraints.98 For Arendt, it was necessary to oppose historicism because it allowed for 
political action that would not be determined by the weight of historical events or trends, such as 
the emergence of the various conditions of modernity that she aligned with the Social.   
In The Human Condition, Arendt writes that Action is a category distinct from ordinary 
human behaviors in that: “action can be judged only by the criterion of greatness because it is in 
its nature to break through the commonly accepted and reach into the extraordinary.”99 The space 
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created for politics is less for deliberation, and instead for speech-making, for a kind of 
immortality that could arise from an idealized Periclean polis. Richard Wolin argues that this 
position is as much a result of Arendt’s Aristotelean influence as it is of existenzphilosophie 
inherited from Heidegger, in which the political arena is articulated as “a matter of existential 
self-affirmation: a terrain of virtuoso performance and individual bravado, a proving ground for 
authenticity.”100 In response to her perception of the Social’s corrosive impact on the political 
life, Arendt’s political vision portrays modernity’s expansion of political concerns into the Social 
realm as the erasure of politics itself. Arendt’s vision of the polis, or in the modern era the 
emergence of worker’s councils, thus represent an antimodern political vision in which economic 
equality, social issues and mass society generally are seen as impediments to political freedom. 
Arendt’s category of the Social, the threat to politics, is also the means by which democratic 
politics have become more egalitarian, and her description of a voluntarist politics of greatness 
can thus be seen as a deeply anti-egalitarian vision.  
More than any other work by Arendt, The Human Condition makes it difficult to 
categorize her political ideas. The centrality of the text in her thought, and the degree to which 
one accepts the rigidity of the boundaries between her ontological concepts, determines the 
extent to which Arendt’s thought is able to be incorporated into a modern context. Extracting a 
positive assessment from the categories of Arendt’s council republicanism requires either 
dismissing the ontological basis of the categories or accepting that the Social itself is a source of 
political action. Jürgen Habermas worked with Arendt’s notion of the public sphere but rejected 
its ontological implications. In The Structural Transformation of the Bourgeois Public Sphere 
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(1962),  Habermas quotes Arendt’s discussion of the changing relationship between public and 
private life during the onset of modernity.101 Yet while Habermas accepted the change in the 
private/public relationship, particularly the expansion of the oikos of the household to the 
creation of market economies, he articulated this change as one of a historical rather than 
ontological analysis. In his historical analysis, Habermas identifies a process of communicative 
publics within the social realm. Thus he avoided Arendt’s institutional argument that some form 
of direct democracy, councils modeled on the polis, are necessary to give substance to freedom.  
Seyla Benhabib questions the centrality of The Human Condition in interpretations of 
Arendt’s thought, by arguing that Arendt was a “reluctant modernist,” someone who, while not 
enamored with modernity, worked within its social and political frameworks rather than against 
it. Benhabib agrees with Pitkin that the sharp separation of economic and political matters in The 
Human Condition is not defensible in reality.102 Benhabib does not see Arendt’s writings on 
politics as always dependent on a foundation of the phenomenologically essentialist concepts 
developed in The Human Condition.103 Influenced by Habermas, Benhabib aims to ground 
Arendt’s political thought on less ontological terms than The Human Condition, such as her 
essays of political commentary. In reference to Arendt’s comments on the European labor 
movement in The Human Condition, Benhabib writes “taking Rosa Luxemburg’s side in her 
dispute with Lenin, Arendt emphasized rather the transformative and politically educative 
aspects of the economic struggle: it was the process of struggle that transformed the animal 
laborans into a citizen of a potentially new public sphere.”104 Rather than interpreting Arendt’s 
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separation of economic and political aspects of the working class movement stemming from her 
ontological framework, Benhabib articulates the separation as one wherein the economic 
concerns of the working class are transformed into political aspirations and demands that enter a 
newly transformed public sphere. Benhabib writes “engaging in politics does not mean 
abandoning economic or social issues; it means fighting for them in the name of principles, 
interests, values, that have a generalizable basis, and that concern us as members of a 
collectivity.”105  
The central question in Arendt’s relationship to modernity is her category of the Political, 
which ushers in the creation of new political institutions and the public space contained therein, 
and places her relationship to modernity at stake. The transformation of social and economic 
concerns into public spaces either means that Arendt is using phenomenological concepts to 
describe how to reclaim the “lost treasure” of Action within a modern context, or, as Arendt’s 
writings on revolution often make more clear, that politics is a realm which emerges distinctly 
and against the Social and is embedded in the founding of new institutions. Arendt’s council 
republicanism then, is either the democratic framework for bringing more public energy into the 
public sphere, or it is the polis reborn, the spontaneous emergence of the human capacity for new 
beginnings and freedom in spite of the dehumanizing conditions of the modern world. In fact, 
according to Arendt’s writings, councils are often both simultaneously.  
Arendt insists upon councils as the necessary component to imbue the institutions of 
republicanism with the spirit of revolution.  While she does focus on the role that the creation of 
a public sphere has towards invigorating democracy, it is not the source of the invigoration. 
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Institutions, rather, are the underlying ontological condition of the human capacity for politics, 
and the source that channels the revolutionary spirit and ensures the political space where a 
public sphere can form. In On Revolution, Arendt argues that the American Revolution 
represents such a moment, and it is the institutional failure to incorporate Jefferson’s ward 
system that threatens to degrade American democracy.106 Arendt’s insistence that direct 
democracy is superior to representative democracy rests on an institutional rather than 
conceptual argument. Similarly, it is the spontaneous emergence of councils that forms the hope 
for an entirely new form of government.107 While at times Arendt’s conception of politics means 
both the creation of a new public sphere and the creation of concrete political institutions, it is 
the institutional meaning that serves as the basis for a conception of the political that begins at 
Natality and ends at a public sphere. 
If much of Luxemburg’s portrait is a reflection of the ontological basis of Arendt’s 
council republicanism, it is not possible to decenter the importance of The Human Condition 
without also jettisoning Luxemburg as a model revolutionary. If Arendt’s council republicanism 
is displaced from her political thinking, so also is the necessity of Natality and the creation of 
directly democratic institutions. If the main goal of Arendtian thought is the establishment and 
maintenance of public spaces where political judgements can be made, Arendt’s revolutionary 
thought becomes less necessary.  However, there is one fruitful avenue of analysis from Arendt’s 
portrait of Luxemburg that may remain; the relationship of the private to the public realm.  
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Section 3.  “A Gift for Un-Belonging:” Pariahs, Parvenus, and Revolutionaries 
One of the most striking similarities between Arendt and Luxemburg is their mutually 
complicated relationship to women’s movements and their reception in feminist theory. Arendt 
was famously reluctant to associate herself with the growing women’s liberation movement of 
her time unless the specific issues were elevated to a wider political arena. As Elizabeth Young-
Bruehl notes, Luxemburg’s similar position played out between herself and her friend Clara 
Zetkin, one of the leaders of the Socialist women’s movement: “Rosa Luxemburg tried to 
convince her friend that the oppression of women, like the oppression of Jews, would only come 
to an end with the advent of true socialism. Arendt, without advocating socialism or any other 
program, thought that women’s issues should be part of a larger political struggle.”108 Like her 
wider political outlook, “incipient in her criticism of the women’s movement is the distinction 
she later drew between social questions and political questions—the latter, she held, should be 
the focus of action.”109  
 To view either Arendt or Luxemburg as simple opponents of women’s liberation would 
do a disservice to perspectives and political ideas that are much more nuanced. Raya 
Dunayevskaya argued that Luxemburg’s hesitancy to be associated with the “women question” 
in Social Democracy had as much to do with a commitment to wider revolutionary goals as with 
her refusal to be placed in that position by the male-dominated leadership of the party. 
Dunayevskaya emphasized Luxemburg’s commitment to supporting women’s suffrage and the 
wider women’s movement throughout her time in the SPD.110 Thus it is necessary to temper the 
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strength of Arendt’s claim of Luxemburg’s “distaste for the women’s emancipation movement, 
to which all other women of her generation and political convictions were irresistibly drawn.”111  
 This, however, does not mean that the question of gender limits Arendt or her analysis of 
Luxemburg. In fact, it is an opening through which a more fruitful political dialogue can take 
place. While Arendt shared Luxemburg’s “distaste for the women’s emancipation movement,” it 
was of greater importance to Arendt that “she was an outsider, not only because she was and 
remained a Polish Jew in a country she disliked and a party she came soon to despise, but also 
because she was a woman.”112 The affinity between the two thinkers as outsiders plays an 
important role in Arendt’s understanding of Rosa Luxemburg’s relationship to her private life, 
and to her own commitment to a political and public life. As Jacqueline Rose noted of 
Luxemburg: “un-belonging was her strength.”113  
 To search for the political meaning of this sense of un-belonging, it is necessary to 
address Arendt’s understanding of the dynamic between private morals and public politics. Both 
thinkers were hesitant to politicize the personal, but it is precisely through this dynamic that a 
more fruitful subtext of Arendt’s portrait emerges. As Rose writes in Women in Dark Times (the 
title inspired by Arendt’s own “dark times”), “that the personal is political is a well-worn 
feminist claim.”114 Approaching Arendt and Luxemburg this way is useful precisely because they 
agreed upon a separation between private and public life. The challenge is not to collapse their 
political views into a personal psychohistory, but instead to see the ways in which the connection 
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between private motivations and politics can challenge Arendt’s own insistence on the separation 
of politics and economics that marks her portrait of Luxemburg.  
 Arendt’s portrait of Rahel Varnhagen provides hints as to the connection between this 
personal/political dynamic at work. This portrait, which aims to “narrate the story of Rahel’s life 
as she herself might have told it,” is at once an investigation of the German-Jewish socialite’s 
attempt to navigate the world of eighteenth century Prussia as a woman and assimilated Jew and, 
as Young-Bruehl and many others have pointed out, a meditation on Arendt’s own turn from 
introverted, subjective romanticism to the issues of the world.115 Arendt portrays Varnhagen’s 
predicament as the choice between a pariah and a parvenu. A pariah as a Jew and woman, Arendt 
portrays Varnhagen as taking the path of the parvenu, pursuing gentile suitors, operating an 
enlightened salon and attempting to gain acceptance into high society. The trade-off that 
Varnhagen makes, according to Arendt, is to live her life as a lie. As a result, Varnhagen’s 
inward turn towards romantic introspection was not a satisfactory solution to her dilemma. The 
book concludes with Varnhagen’s return to identification with her Jewishness (as a pariah), but 
with a renewed positive perspective, and a rejection of the individual isolation and dishonesty of 
the life of a parvenu.116 
 Arendt began to write Rahel Varnhagen in Berlin in 1929, but it was not published until 
1957, well into her life in America. The work contained several of the concerns that would later 
influence Arendt’s existentialist concepts in the Human Condition—most notably an early 
version of the concept of the Social as a distinctly modern phenomenon. Her notions of pariah 
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and parvenu, both marked by the individual involvement in the social world, would later give 
way to political concerns that only emerge on the margins of the central narrative of Varnhagen. 
Hannah Pitkin identifies several of these moments in the text where a third, political option is 
mentioned for pariahs.117 Arendt argues that this political option, such as a political struggle for 
equal rights, was not open to Jews of Varnhagen’s era.118 This political option, not possible 
during Varnhagen’s era but certainly during Arendt’s, may be an indication of how to view 
Arendt’s interpretation of Luxemburg’s relationship to her otherness and her wider political 
aspirations. Like Arendt’s own identification with Varnhagen’s struggle between private 
inwardness and a public life, Luxemburg and Arendt insist on the centrality of political action to 
any public life.  
Arendt interpreted Luxemburg’s otherness and that of her comrades in the SDKPiL as a 
preeminent political virtue.  This “peer group,” was comprised mainly Jewish intellectual-
activists from Poland, whom Nettl distinguishes from the party organizers of the SPD, or the 
professional revolutionary Bolsheviks. Arendt argues that it is the distinctive Jewish middle class 
background, and that:  
without which the emergence of the ethical code of the peer group would be nearly 
incomprehensible. The hidden equalizer of those who always treated one another as 
equals—and hardly anybody else—was the essentially the simple experience of a 
childhood world in which mutual respect and unconditional trust, a universal humanity 
and a genuine, almost naïve contempt for social and ethnic distinctions were taken for 
granted. What members of the peer group had in common was what can only be called 
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moral taste, which is so different from “moral principles”; the authenticity of their 
morality they owed to having grown up in a world that was not out of joint.119 
It is this sense of universal values that Arendt attributes to a European identity amongst this 
radical group of the Jewish intelligentsia. Their experience of otherness is transferred into a 
universal political experience. Yet Arendt argues that this is precisely where Luxemburg’s 
internationalism was mistaken. Luxemburg placed much of her energy in Socialist 
Internationalism, and the SDKPiL was notable precisely for its stance against any kind of 
nationalism. For Arendt, Luxemburg’s support of the notion that “the fatherland of the working 
class is the socialist movement” is a clichéd statement with no real political meaning. Arendt 
argued that a movement is not a “land.”120   Instead, Arendt reads Luxemburg and her peer 
groups internationalism as, at best, a warning of the terrible nationalism to follow in the decades 
after her death.  
 Arendt agrees with Nettl, that it would be “’lamentably absurd’ to discover in 
[Luxemburg’s] anti-nationalism ‘a particularly Jewish quality.’”121 Arendt was careful to draw a 
distinction between this notion and one of middle class intellectuals who are able to articulate 
their status as others into specifically Nietzschean “good Europeans”; defined not by a stereotype 
of cosmopolitan rootlessness, but by an embracing of universal European values. As Rose notes, 
“for Arendt, it is paradoxically her cosmopolitanism which shows how profoundly Luxemburg 
was in fact Jewish-identified.”122 What this paradoxical view encapsulated was the complex 
interrelationship to which Arendt would often hint, wherein the private, moral and particular 
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concerns were elevated into the Political—all the ways in which, perhaps despite her opinions on 
the social realm, connections are made between the Social and Political, and the private and the 
public. It is the politicization of the status of otherness, an avenue not to available to Rahel 
Varnhagen, that seems to have been open to Rosa Luxemburg and her comrades, if only 
temporarily, and if only to presage the darkness to come. 
The Social is the undercurrent that lies beneath the surface of the argument: the peer 
group is defined by moral taste and devotion to one another rather than any sort of ideological 
commitment to socialism. Arendt disagrees with Nettl’s assessment that Luxemburg’s 
participation in party affairs was a result of an intense ambition towards a party career. An 
ambitious pursuit of a party career would not mark Luxemburg as a revolutionary who sought 
higher principles than the bureaucratic, stultifying life of party politics that Arendt associated 
with the Social. Instead of seeing Luxemburg’s writings as occurring within her party life—a life 
spent immersed in internal party politics and attempts to steer party policy in revolutionary 
directions—Arendt attributes Nettl’s reading to “the natural force of a temperament capable, in 
her own laughing words, of ‘setting a prairie on fire,’ which propelled her almost willy-nilly into 
public affairs.”123 Arendt referred to the “moral standards” of the “peer group” for whom “such 
things as ambition, career, status, and even mere success were under the strictest taboo.”124 
Careerism, in this sense, is too close to the world of the Social, whereas Action/politics must be 
driven by a commitment to higher motivations. Any connection between a party career in Social 
Democratic politics and the wider political possibilities of that party are made impossible by 
Arendt’s understanding of party politics as part of the anti-political phenomenon of the Social, 
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rather than a political actor itself. Luxemburg’s own understanding between the role the party 
plays in channeling the spontaneous energy of the masses is lost in Arendt’s juxtaposition 
between party politics and the moral and elevated political aspirations and sense attributed to her. 
Arendt’s contrast of the “peer group” to the SPD is best understood as this juxtaposition of 
politics to the Social, rather than the various dynamics of Second International Socialism that 
Nettl emphasizes.  
Unlikely Feminists  
As Benhabib notes, a more fruitful exercise is to search at the margins for the feminist 
subtext of Arendt’s work and, in the process, displace the centrality of The Human Condition and 
its philosophical-political concepts.125 Reinterpreting the salons of Rahel Varnhagen, Benhabib 
presents these women-dominated spaces as an alternative to what she interprets as the male-
dominated space of the polis in the Human Condition. By displacing the center of Arendt’s 
thought from the councils and polis (indicative of the realm of Action), Benhabib removes the 
source of the autonomy of the Political and recognizes the public sphere of the salons as an 
alternative source of a modern public space that does not fall into the ontological boundaries of 
the polis. This is one possible interpretation of Luxemburg’s “peer group,” as an alternative 
public space of moral trust and intimacy in political action. The “peer group” also fits 
Benhabib’s view of the commonality between the salons and polis insofar as they were based on 
a profound equality between members, and “contribute to the formation of a ‘civic friendship,’ 
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either among a group of citizens or among a group of private, like-minded individuals who can 
gather for a common political purpose.”126 
However, in the case of Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg, this decentering displaces not 
only the philosophical claims in The Human Condition but also her conception of Luxemburg as 
a model revolutionary. Benhabib’s goal—to focus on the creation of public space—also has an 
institutional requirement of Arendt’s work that can only come from the presupposition of 
spontaneous political action by the public. The salons or Luxemburg’s peer group are not the 
same as the polis because they are neither the source of political action (for Arendt, no 
revolutionary can create a revolution), nor are they the spaces at the outcome of the revolution. 
Luxemburg serves as a model revolutionary for Arendt, an indication of the validity of the 
ontological political concepts in her thinking. By removing the polis as the goal of a revolution 
and focusing instead on the public space of the Salon, Benhabib opens an avenue for a 
reinterpretation of Arendt’s commitment to a universalist public sphere, but also displaces the 
revolutionary aspects of Arendt’s thinking in which Luxemburg is a key figure.   
Rose emphasizes the strengths that Luxemburg’s position as an outsider brought to her, 
which “also gave her a kind of freedom to think the un-thought, to force the unthinkable into the 
language of politics.”127 Rose argues that Luxemburg’s position challenged the judgements and 
norms of the socialist party establishment precisely because of the freedom that this outsider 
status provided. What emerged from Luxemburg’s position as an outsider was an ability to 
articulate particular social issues within a larger political universalist context. As Arendt notes in 
Origins, Luxemburg “refused to read the Dreyfus affair, for example, as a Jewish matter, seeing 
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it in terms of the struggle of socialism against militarism and clericalism, which it also was.”128 
Rose makes a similar connection to Luxemburg’s writing on imperialism, in which she is able to 
grasp the overall political struggle, while comparing the plight of European Jews under anti-
semitism to that of the racialized violence inflicted upon Europe’s imperial subjects. Arendt 
draws this connection out in much more detail in Origins.129 The point here is not to collapse the 
specificities of the particular struggles into a wider political framework, but instead to heed the 
complex interconnectedness of social, economic and political issues. As Rose writes: 
It was not that women’s demands should come second to class struggle, but that everyone 
should be free—a lesson today’s “post-feminism” might heed. Everything was connected. 
This we might say is still the true meaning of socialist feminism—that women cannot 
possibly emancipate themselves while ignoring the inequities of a rampantly unequal 
world.130  
As Maria Tamboukou argues, the feminist revival of these two unlikely feminist figures is based 
on precisely this connection between Arendt and Luxemburg’s mutual position as women 
participating in politics that bridged the personal and political.131  A contrast emerges in Arendt’s 
idealized political sphere, in which politics are elevated above social and economic issues, and in 
Luxemburg’s dialectical vision of the interconnected nature of those struggles.   
Again, the divergence between Luxemburg and Arendt is clearest in the treatment of 
ontological politics. However, avenues of analysis, such as those explored by Benhabib or Rose, 
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point to the possibility of elevating specific social issues out of the Social and into the public 
sphere and universalist political discourse. This movement from private motivations to political 
action does not necessarily end in a kind of Periclean democratic discourse. In fact, the example 
of Luxemburg shows just how fruitful the interrelationship between participation in social 
movements and political goals, such as civil rights and economic justice, can not only become 
intertwined, but can dialectically escalate towards an emancipatory vision. The difficulty lies in 
disentangling this subtext from Arendt’s overall ontological project.  
If Arendt’s ontological politics are jettisoned in the same manner that Marxism is from 
Luxemburg, perhaps the connection between the Social and politics can be read in reverse: 
instead the threat of the Social to politics, the goal itself is the expansion of politics into the 
social realm—expanding the freedom of the polis into oikos. As Rose emphasizes, the key to 
understanding Luxemburg’s approach is to focus on the interconnectedness of social, economic 
and political struggles. Luxemburg’s dialectical method of understanding this approach to 
revolutionary theory is quite distinct from that of Arendt. The political concepts that most mark 
this distinction are the differences between Arendt’s notion of Action and Luxemburg’s 
dialectical method of praxis.  
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Section 4. Revolutionaries and Dark Times: Action and Praxis for our Time 
 
Is it possible to imagine Arendt’s theory as the creation of an inclusive public sphere and 
to rearticulate the Social as an analysis of the threats of modernity, but not its outright rejection? 
Pitkin proposes the possibility of a synthesis between Arendt’s theory of the Social and the 
concept of alienation. She argues that if the boundaries between the Political and Social were 
loosened, and Arendt was able to interpret Marx’s theory of alienation as a similar phenomenon 
to her idea of the Social, then such parallels could be fruitful (it is, of course, not Pitkin’s 
assertion that Marx and Arendt could have such different theories completely reconciled).132 
However, in the case of Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg, this possibility is again confounded by 
her role as an example of Arendt’s own revolutionary theories. Ernst Vollrath attempts such a 
synthesis in “Luxemburg’s Theory of Revolution,” but in the process collapses Luxemburg into 
many of Arendt’s underlying political frameworks articulated in The Human Condition. The 
result is a non-dialectical interpretation of Luxemburg as a liberator of the proletariat from 
political impotency at the hands of capitalism. In contrast, Georg Lukács is able to grasp the full 
dialectical dimension of Luxemburg’s thought. A comparison of Arendt’s concept of Action with 
Luxemburg’s dialectical method and praxis results in completely differing visions of democracy 
and its relationships to modernity. Furthermore, Lukács also opens the door to reframing a 
comparative analysis of Luxemburg and Arendt within the contemporary period.  
In “Luxemburg’s Theory of Revolution,” Ernst Vollrath attempts an Arendtian reading of 
Luxemburg’s theories. Following Arendt’s critique of Marx in The Human Condition, Vollrath 
argues that Marx saw revolution as a means to achieve socialism, rather than as a separate 
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phenomenon in itself. This is because “to Marx, as to Orthodox Marxism, the political realm and 
all action in it are secondary and derivative in kind.”133 Vollrath analyzes Luxemburg’s writings 
along the same lines of Arendt’s, distinguishing between the moment of revolution and ensuring 
the freedom won in a new form of government. To address the moment of revolution, he maps 
Arendt’s theory of Action onto Luxemburg’s concept of spontaneity from the “The Mass Strike.” 
Vollrath acknowledges Luxemburg’s view that politics and economics are deeply entwined, but 
reads this from the perspective of Arendt’s distinction between the Social and the Political. In 
Vollrath’s reading, the proletariat as such are mere animal laborans, reduced by capitalism to a 
state where any meaningful engagement in the political realm is denied to them.134 The mass 
strike, political action on the part of the proletariat, liberates them from these constraints and 
transforms the proletariat into full citizens as the revolution brings this democratic substance to 
formal republicanism. The unity of economics and politics, for Vollrath, is thus articulated along 
the lines of the Social and the Political from The Human Condition: capitalism disempowers the 
political capacity of humans by reducing them to proletarians; through political action, the 
proletariat are liberated not just from capitalism but from the limitations of the socio-economic 
realm generally. At no point in Vollrath’s articulation of Luxemburg’s revolutionary theory does 
socialist democracy become anything more than an exclusively political democracy now made 
more substantial by the incorporation of the revolutionary spirit.  
Furthermore, Vollrath’s argument, that the proletariat undergoes a transformation into 
political subjects, is very close to Jay and Wolin’s critique that the political realm of Arendtian 
theory becomes a space of existential or individual actualization. At stake is not the issue that 
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politics should possess a transformative quality, but rather what the transformation entails. 
Capitalism assumes an all-encompassing weight, reducing humans to mere animal laborans in 
the same manner as the looming “monstrous” quality of the Social. While Vollrath quotes from 
Luxemburg’s “The Mass Strike,” “there is no separating [revolution’s] economic and its political 
element,” he posits this as a cause and effect argument: the economic sphere (Social) blocks the 
self-actualization of the workers when they are able to enter the political realm (Action).135 
Luxemburg’s own dialectical notion of Marxist method, however, relies upon a very different 
notion of praxis, one in which emancipation can occur through a transformation of the economic 
as well as political sphere. As Wolin argues, this notion of praxis, in which emancipation is 
available for the many, is quite different from the “antidemocratic ontological tradition.”136 Yet 
while Luxemburg’s theory of praxis avoids the collapsing of economic factors into an 
autonomous political sphere, her socialist theory of revolution and democracy has limitations of 
its own that will be explored below.    
 One of the difficulties in analyzing Luxemburg’s revolutionary theory is the relationship 
between the economic development of capitalism and the spontaneous revolutionary potential of 
the masses. As Jay emphasized, Arendt focused on the subjective factor of Luxemburg’s theory 
of revolution while neglecting the objective.137 Arendt praised Luxemburg’s willingness to 
disagree with Marx and her commitment to analyzing reality with a clear mind because “what 
mattered most in her view was reality, in all its wonderful and all its frightful aspects, even more 
than revolution itself.”138 Arendt argued in Men in Dark Times that Luxemburg’s Accumulation 
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of Capital was non-Marxist because it implied that capitalism was not a “closed system that 
generated its own contradiction and was ‘pregnant with revolution’” and thus the work 
“contradicted the very foundations of Marxian and Hegelian dialectics, which hold that every 
thesis must create its own anti-thesis.”139  
 Yet Luxemburg’s notion of spontaneity was not as divorced from her understanding of 
the economic reality of capitalism as Arendt believed. Nor was it as anti-dialectical as Arendt has 
claimed. In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács frames Luxemburg’s revolutionary theory 
as rooted in the dialectical relationship between subjective and objective factors. The relationship 
between the economic factors that bring the possibility of revolution to the fore, and the 
necessity of channeling spontaneous worker action into great levels of political action is the 
dialectical relationship at the core of Luxemburg’s theory. Lukács writes “the proletariat is, then, 
at one and the same time the product of the permanent crisis in capitalism and the instrument of 
those tendencies which drive capitalism towards crisis.”140 Luxemburg argued that spontaneous 
political action can be channeled by the revolutionary party and raise class consciousness. 
Praxis, the unity of theory of practice, is the result of Luxemburg’s revolutionary theory, in 
which “class consciousness is the ‘ethics’ of the proletariat, the unity of its theory and its 
practice, the point at which the economic necessity of its struggle for liberation changes 
dialectically into freedom.”141 Lukács’ Hegelian Marxist interpretation of Luxemburg’s 
revolutionary theory is thus the opposite of Arendt’s. Arendt interprets Luxemburg’s belief in 
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spontaneity as indicative of her distance from a number of Marxist theoretical notions: dialectics, 
historical materialism and socio-economic questions.  
 Through the lens of Arendt’s understanding of the Social, she interpreted Luxemburg’s 
economic works as a rejection of more than just mechanistic Marxism. Arendt interpreted her 
comments on the cruel and racist violence against imperial subjects as an indication of a 
willingness to look at historical reality. Rather than interpreting Luxemburg’s conflict with 
Eduard Bernstein and later, Karl Kautsky, as an attempt to chart a course between reformism and 
theoretical stagnation, Arendt positions the conflicts and debates along the lines of her own 
theories of Action and the Social as further proof that Luxemburg’s main opponent was any sort 
of political strategy based on Marxian economic analysis. What Arendt misread was precisely 
the dialectical revolutionary strategy described by Lukács: Luxemburg could oppose Bernstein 
because spontaneous revolutionary action raised class consciousness, and could oppose 
Kautsky’s inaction for the exactly the same reason. This does not indicate that Luxemburg 
rejected the “objective” factor that social and economic forces are not only related to the 
conditions of revolution, but, rather created the condition for spontaneous action and unity in 
revolutionary praxis.  
 Luxemburg’s critique of Lenin’s methods in “The Russian Revolution” and her insistence 
upon democratic institutions in which “the living fluid of the popular mood continuously flows” 
is the theoretically closest element between Arendt’s and Luxemburg’s political ideas.142  Yet 
even this point is marked by Arendt’s interpretation of Marxism. Arendt fails to grasp the second 
part of Luxemburg’s critique in which she warns against both Bolshevik dictatorship, and 
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Kautsky’s insistence on waiting for correct material conditions.143 Luxemburg praises the 
Bolshevik’s seizure of power throughout the text, not because the economic or social conditions 
were ripe, but because she believed that the socialist revolution itself was part of the dialectical 
process of creating the conditions for a socialist future. What Luxemburg called “socialist 
democracy” in the text is thus distinguished from “bourgeois democracy.” While Kautsky 
wished to wait for economic conditions to be “ripe” for revolution and return to bourgeois 
revolution, and the Bolsheviks established a dictatorship in rejection of bourgeois democracy. 
For Luxemburg: 
Socialist democracy begins simultaneously with the beginnings of the destruction of class 
rule and of the construction of socialism. It begins at the very moment of the seizure of 
power by the socialist party. It is the same thing as the dictatorship of the proletariat.  
Yes, dictatorship! But this dictatorship consists in the manner of applying democracy, not 
in its elimination, in energetic, resolute attacks upon the well-entrenched right and 
economic relationships of bourgeois society, without which a socialist transformation 
cannot be accomplished.144 
Luxemburg’s dialectical method is thus quite distinct from Arendt’s interpretation of her 
revolutionary inclination. Rather than a heroic revolutionary will towards “freedom and 
absolutely nothing else” or motivated by primarily ethical reasons, Luxemburg’s revolutionary 
theory was a dialectical combination of social and economic analysis, and a belief in the political 
education of the masses through political action and participation. In short, Luxemburg’s 
revolutionary theory was neither a rejection of socio-economic motivations for politics, nor a 
																																								 																				
143 Luxemburg, 307. 
144 Luxemburg, 308. 
	 64	
republicanism that rose above an ideological commitment to socialism—Luxemburg’s 
revolutionary theory was precisely this attempt to understand the relationship between socio-
economic forces and political action and to reconcile the economic and political aspirations of 
socialist democracy.  
Luxemburg’s commitment to democracy and freedom was not merely ethical, but instead 
perpetuated a legacy of the tradition of Second International Socialism, in which socialist 
democracy would be the fulfillment of the democratic potential of bourgeois society. As Norman 
Geras notes in “Democracy and the Ends of Marxism,” the Marxist legacy has often had a 
contested legacy on precisely the question of the role of bourgeois democracy in the creation of 
socialist democracy: “it was thought of by some as being in basic continuity with the major 
institutions of existing democracy, as a consolidation and enlargement of these. Others have 
viewed it rather as discontinuous with them, as a sharp, punctual break in an institutional 
process.”145 Luxemburg’s robust defense of “democratic institutions” in “The Russian 
Revolution,” and her insistence on maintaining traditionally “bourgeois freedoms” such as 
freedom of speech and civil rights almost certainly places her in the former camp. In fact, as 
Stephen Eric Bronner notes, Luxemburg herself vacillated between throwing her support behind 
the emergence of councils (soviets) or republican institutions during the final revolutionary 
period of her life.146 Unlike Arendt, for whom direct democracy was a necessary component of 
maintaining the revolutionary spirit, for Luxemburg it did not necessarily matter which 
institutions were in place, so long as they were conduits through which the democratic actions of 
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the masses could operate. Bronner writes “It’s also time to squelch the myth propagated by 
Hannah Arendt about soviets arising in every revolution—unless you identify revolution only 
with those you like.”147 The problem, of course, is that this is precisely what Arendt did think. 
Arendt associated the emergence of councils with the beginning of a revolution, and only their 
emergence was the sign of a true revolutionary moment. Luxemburg, however, was much more 
willing to adapt to political circumstances, not only because of the historical idea of transforming 
bourgeois democracy, but also because of her dialectical method of working within the objective 
political and economic realities of the existing situation.    
Unlike the prescriptive political vision that Arendt believed was necessary, Luxemburg 
was careful to stress the unknowability of paths such a socialist democratic revolution could 
take. Against the Bolsheviks, Luxemburg writes: “what we possess in our program is nothing but 
a few main signposts which indicate the general direction in which to look for the necessary 
measures, and the indications are mainly negative in character at that” and yet “that is not a 
shortcoming but rather the very thing that makes scientific socialism superior to the utopian 
varieties.”148 In a similar vein, the lack of a comprehensive political system in Luxemburg’s 
writing, a “Luxemburgism” is an advantage rather than a disadvantage.  
As Jacqueline Rose argues, Luxemburg’s openness to spontaneity and the progression of 
revolution is a result of there being “for Luxemburg, something radically unknowable at the core 
of political life.”149 Yet Rose suggests that this openness is itself indicative of the limits of the 
Enlightenment project, that reason is what is needed to navigate dark times.150 However, there is 
																																								 																				
147 Bronner, 62. 
148 Luxemburg, “The Russian Revolution,” 305–6.  
149 Rose, Women in Dark Times, 33. 
150 Rose, xi–xii. 
	 66	
another possible reading of Luxemburg’s open dialectical method that is not indicative of such a 
critique of the Enlightenment project.  As Geras notes, the absence of any prescriptive political 
vision can also been read as the creation of “the space of democracy. It is an arena for that 
diversity, experiment and negotiation through which alone socialism can be created.”151 In 
“Social Reform or Revolution” (1899), Luxemburg quotes Marx from the 18th Brumaire of Louis 
Napoleon, that in contrast to bourgeois revolutions, which emerge in one continuous burst of 
political activity, proletarian revolutions rise, are defeated, critique themselves and change, and 
then rise again.152  
Revolution and Democracy  
 The introduction of Marxist praxis creates an additional layer of analysis for any 
comparison of Arendt and Luxemburg. In contrast to Arendt’s anti-historicist interpretation of 
revolution, a Hegelian-Marxist understanding of praxis requires an understanding of the 
historical reality of objective and subjective factors to every moment of critical analysis. 
Following Lukács, it must then be asked what kind of relevance and applicability Arendt and 
Luxemburg’s understanding of revolution have to any contemporary political situation. Both 
thinkers have experienced renewed interest driven by political developments, such as the 
degradation of liberal democracy in the western world and the rise of far-right populism. 
Additionally, a new collected volume of Arendt’s later writings, Thinking Without a Bannister, 
was published in 2019. In Why Read Arendt Now (2018), Richard Bernstein asks “Why this 
growing interest – and why especially the recent spike of interest in her work? Arendt was 
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remarkably perceptive about some of the deepest problems, perplexities, and dangerous 
tendencies in modern political life. Many of these have not disappeared; they have become more 
intense and dangerous.”153 Bernstein notes that Arendt’s perceptive discussions in Origins 
contain many troubling parallels to our own time: large numbers of stateless persons and 
migration crises, the increased normalization of nationalist and racist public discourse, and the 
troubling trend of what Arendt would call “lying in politics.” Bernstein is especially insightful on 
the latter, pointing out the dangers of an untruthful political discourse; the dangers that emerge 
when the shared political reality of a polity is disrupted by lying in a form of image making. 
Bernstein writes that “the difference between the traditional political lie and the modern lie is the 
difference between hiding something and destroying it.”154  
 Interest in Luxemburg has also grown in the contemporary period, albeit to a lesser 
extent. Peter Hudis argues that interest in Luxemburg, especially her economic writings (recently 
published as a collected works by Verso Books as part of a project to publish her entire collected 
works in English) has risen along with a general interest in Marxist theory since the 2008 
economic crash.155 One notable result of this rise in interest has been the republication of a new 
edition of Nettl’s biography of Rosa Luxemburg (2019). This renewed enthusiasm for 
Luxemburg’s thinking is quite different from the last period of interest in her work amongst the 
New Left. For this generation of Leftists, Luxemburg’s combined interest in revolutionary and 
democratic politics served as an alternative trajectory of real existing socialism since Stalin. As 
Bronner wrote in his earlier Rosa Luxemburg: Revolutionary for our Times (1980), “for there can 
be little doubt that many people still continue to picture the socialist society in terms of a Marx-
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Lenin-Stalin lineage. Rosa Luxemburg helps to articulate an alternative.”156 Yet the historical 
circumstances of the era of the New Left are quite different from the contemporary period: the 
working class in the Western world is less organized and militant, the prospects of revolution 
much more dim and the threat of a return to “dark times” looms instead of the prospect of an 
emancipated society.  
 In “Red Dreams and the New Millennium: Notes on the Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg,” 
Bronner revises his assessment of Luxemburg’s legacy that he initially published in 1981. He 
argues that the conditions of a new historical reality require a reevaluation of her revolutionary 
ideas, not because they were ill suited to praxis in her time, but because they are ill suited to the 
contemporary period. The ensuing debate in the journal New Politics and collected in the book 
Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Legacy, between Bronner and his critics focused particularly on 
his claim that the reevaluation of Luxemburg is “a matter of freeing her thinking from an 
outmoded teleology and drawing political consequences.”157 Bronner argues that simply copying 
Luxemburg’s revolutionary ideas, suited to a praxis between a mass socialist movement and the 
historical conditions of the early twentieth century, in our own time would not follow the Marxist 
dialectical method that Luxemburg herself employed.158 Simply put: expecting that Luxemburg’s 
revolutionary ideas to apply to a time when they are not based in a subjective or objective reality 
would be a disservice to the very dialectical Marxist method of analyzing the reality of those 
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conditions within the contemporary political situation, or acting as part of a political movement 
accordingly.  
 Furthermore, Luxemburg’s own position on socialist democracy showed serious 
problems in “The Russian Revolution.” Her position in the text is more complicated than a 
simple critique of Bolshevik dictatorship as Arendt has articulated. Luxemburg, while accepting 
the complexity and speed of real political developments, praises the Bolsheviks for recognizing 
that “the real situation in which the Russian Revolution found itself, narrowed down in a few 
months to the alternative: victory of the counter-revolution or dictatorship of the proletariat.”159 
For Luxemburg, supporting the Bolshevik seizure of power saved the revolution for the prospect 
of democracy, yet their tactics in doing so required maintaining the institutions of democracy. 
Luxemburg thus presents a kind of paradox, one in which the Bolsheviks must retain power but 
also maintain democracy—the possibility of losing power through the democratic institutions is 
not addressed. This position blurs the distinctions between bourgeois and socialist democracy: if 
the Bolshevik seizure of power ensures the possibility of democracy through those institutions of 
bourgeois democracy, what is the difference between socialist democracy once the revolution is 
successful? Likewise, if the Bolsheviks were voted out of power by those very same institutions, 
then in what sense is the revolution “socialist” at all? While the “objective” conditions of the 
revolution meant to Luxemburg that the Bolsheviks should seize power, what about the 
“subjective” conditions? In order to maintain power, the Bolsheviks would need to maintain the 
support of the majority of the population. Yet as Luxemburg writes in “The Russian Revolution,” 
“the true dialectic of revolutions, however, stands this wisdom of parliamentary mores on its 
head: not through a majority to revolutionary tactics, but through revolutionary tactics to a 
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majority.”160 Luxemburg’s theory of spontaneity means that the subjective factor of class 
consciousness of the proletariat grows as the organization channels its political energy through 
objective social conditions. Yet what happens if this majority does not materialize through 
revolutionary action? Furthermore, As Eric Weitz argues, even Luxemburg’s position on 
expanding the democratic sphere through the institutions of councils was of secondary 
importance to the revolutionary fervor of mass action, relegating democracy to secondary 
importance while elevating popular action.161  
 These questions on Luxemburg’s position on democracy would require an historical work 
in its own right that could better navigate the complexities and pace of historical events in Russia 
1917 and Germany 1918-1919. For the purposes of this analysis, it is enough to show that as 
much as Luxemburg predicted the rise of bureaucratic despotism in the Soviet Union, her own 
theory of revolutionary spontaneity failed to materialize in either the Russian or the German 
revolution. Luxemburg’s dialectical theory of spontaneity and corresponding notion of praxis 
may be more useful tools for navigating the political realities of the modern world, particularly in 
their ability to grasp the importance of interrelatedness between economic and political spheres.  
Yet Luxemburg falls into a similar revolutionary romanticism as does Arendt’s theory of 
revolution. Any reliance on an “authentic” revolutionary politics per Luxemburg, or maintaining 
the urgency of her revolutionary ambitions in a time when the same historical or political 
conditions are not present, would be a mistake.162 To do so would result in the creation of another 
“Luxemburgism:” the positioning of Luxemburg as an example of revolutionary voluntarism 
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rather than a follower of Marx’s dialectical method. Most notably absent from these conditions 
that made revolution possible for Luxemburg is the presence of a mass socialist party that could 
channel spontaneous energy of the masses into a socialist democracy. 
 A comparison of Arendt’s concept of Action and Luxemburg’s notion of praxis does 
bring two similarities in their political thinking to light: first, the subjective factor in revolution 
and democracy is emphasized as the element that brings substance to democratic institutions. In 
the case of Arendt, the revolutionary spirit captures the ontological category of Natality as the 
source of human freedom. Arendt argues that democratic societies must strive to maintain the 
revolutionary spirit in order to create a space of individual self-actualization possible in a 
democratic public sphere. Luxemburg’s dialectical revolutionary theory relies upon the 
dialectical raising of consciousness amongst the proletariat in order to channel its energy through 
democratic institutions. In doing so, Luxemburg argues that revolutions bypass the parliamentary 
paralysis impacting parties such as the SPD, and thus bring the democratic energy of the masses 
to the fore. Both thinkers rely upon revolution as a means to bypass what they perceived to be 
the limitations of representative democracy.  
It is ironic that the factor that Arendt juxtaposed to Luxemburg’s commitment to 
spontaneity, the mass party, is precisely the aspect of Luxemburg’s political thinking that is more 
relevant to our time. Without these components, it makes little sense to commit to an idealized 
socialist revolution, with no mass support and no effective organizational apparatus to carry it 
out. Yet Luxemburg’s own thinking relies upon the channeling of revolutionary energy to bring 
about socialist democracy as a “higher form” of democracy. Thus the relevance of Luxemburg to 
the contemporary situation is precisely those parts of Arendt’s analysis that most contradict her 
ontological distinction between Action and the Social, of which Luxemburg serves as a model: 
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contemporary political reality calls not for revolutionary politics, but patient movement and 
organization-building. What an analysis of Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg reveals is not only 
the distance between Arendt’s ontological politics and Luxemburg’s Marxism, but also their 
shared interest in a politics of exception that lowers the value of the mundane aspects of 
democratic processes in favor of revolutionary passion and action.   
If revolution is no longer a central feature of relevance to Luxemburg’s thinking, as 
Bronner argues, then what remains outside of her revolutionary theory? Luxemburg’s 
understanding of the distinction between socialist and bourgeois democracy relies upon raising 
class consciousness among the proletariat in order to become the majority of a post-revolution 
democratic socialist society. If this class-oriented revolutionary theory is jettisoned, then all that 
would remain would be, on one hand, the committed romantic revolutionary that Arendt 
reinterpreted in her portrait, or on the other, a more classical Marxist analysis of economic and 
political conditions in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century capitalist political economy. If 
Luxemburg’s position on democracy is superior to Arendt’s, it is in the incorporation of the 
interrelatedness of economic and political realities within an understanding of what democracy 
could be, and the reality of patient and organizational political work with which to bring it out. 
As Bronner argues, “what would more socialism involve? Nothing other than that the working 
class itself share in the formulation of socio-economic policy, express its unrecognized demands 
in political terms, and begin to build its own public culture.”163  In contrast to Arendt, Bronner 
argues that “such concerns are fundamental to Rosa Luxemburg’s vision of socialism which 
seeks an extension of democracy through the socialization of the means of production—to 
deepen the workers’ own capacities for self-administration. Thus the democratization of society 
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as a whole becomes the goal of socialism.”164  Yet as the limitations of Luxemburg’s position in 
“The Russian Revolution” show, the route to such a possible future, and the distinction between 
existing liberal democracy and the further democratization of the social and economic realms, 
may not necessarily lie in revolution.  
Arendt’s category of Action does not require such patient, organizational work. It focuses 
on the spontaneous possibilities of human beginnings. This is not to say that Arendt believed that 
spontaneous uprisings emerged at random. It would be a misreading to dismiss her analysis of 
the conditions that made these uprising possible: for example, Arendt’s careful description of the 
political situation in the Eastern Bloc that followed de-Stalinization and led to the Hungarian 
Revolution.165 Yet the council republicanism that emerges from the ontological concepts of The 
Human Condition presents a direct democratic politics that is juxtaposed to the Social and 
economic concerns which, rather than being the source of political action, are threats to public, 
political life. While Arendt’s analysis in Origins provides one model for analyzing the dangers to 
public and political life in the contemporary period, her prescription, an idealized republicanism, 
precludes the possibility of politically addressing economic issues. Spontaneous movements such 
as Occupy Wall Street, stemming from economic issues, are difficult to place into an Arendtian 
context without extruding the economic concerns in a similar way to Arendt’s separation of the 
political from the economic worker’s councils in the Hungarian Revolution.  
 Arendt’s republicanism, with its focus on heroic actions, the pursuit of liberation, and the 
enshrining of freedom in direct democracy, stands in stark contrast to the long tradition of 
socialist organizing that led to the creation of what Kolakowski calls “The Golden Age of 
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Socialism” in the Second International.166 Arendt argues that the way to give democratic politics 
the substance of freedom is to capture the revolutionary spirit: the spark of Natality that sends a 
revolutionary in search of freedom and nothing else. In contrast, Luxemburg’s position 
incorporates questions of economic democracy as a necessary component of expanding freedom. 
The irreconcilability of Luxemburg’s socialist democracy and Arendt’s council republicanism is 
precisely the difference between the extension of democracy into the economic sphere, and 
Arendt’s refusal to combine the Political and the Social. Arendt’s insistence on the separation of 
these two spheres not only collapses her portrait of Luxemburg, but manages to overlook this 
aspect of Luxemburg’s theory of democracy entirely. Rather than seeing the Social as the threat 
of modernity to politics, Luxemburg’s theory is an attempt to expand democracy to those aspects 
of modern life that Arendt would later reject. Instead of seeing animal laborans as potential 
citizens needing to be elevated into a “higher” form of democracy, as Vollrath argues, 
Luxemburg’s socialist democracy aims to bring democracy into those economic and social 
spaces created by modernity and to open its emancipatory possibilities. While Arendt’s notion of 
republicanism is designed to counter the threats of modernity, typified into her concept of the 
Social, Luxemburg’s socialist democracy seeks to expand the liberatory potential of modernity 
by extending it into the socio-economic realm.  
 Does this mean that Arendt’s political philosophy is not relevant to our era at all? As 
Benhabib models, by displacing the centrality of The Human Condition, Arendt’s political 
thought can be interpreted away from the rigidity of its ontological language. Yet in doing so, 
Arendt’s commitment to revolution as the source of freedom, and her associated portrait of 
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Luxemburg, must be jettisoned. Similarly, the limitations of Luxemburg’s revolutionary theory 
also point to the complexity of any question on the rethinking of democratic theory to 
incorporate those social and economic questions that Arendt refused to incorporate into her 
sphere of the Political. The insights gained from this analysis of Arendt, one that focuses on the 
possibilities of inclusive public spheres and the development and maintenance of an inclusive 
public discourse, can be very fruitful.  Rather than seeing socialist politics along the lines of a 
division between (political) Action and the Social, the creation of a new socialist movement can 
be viewed as the renewed interest in expanding the public sphere to incorporate economic and 




Arendt’s portrait of Luxemburg was inspired by her observation of the Hungarian 
Revolution and their shared interest in spontaneity. What each thinker meant by spontaneity, 
however, was radically different. It is not simply a matter of pointing to where Arendt was 
mistaken. To do so would be a disservice to the construction of a portrait that is rich with both 
personal and political affinities, even though the overall analysis is flawed. Arendt did not simply 
misunderstand Luxemburg’s Marxism, but rather articulated Luxemburg through a lens with 
which she sought to redeem her from a contested legacy–one in which she was defined more by 
her enemies than her friends. Arendt sought to draw a distinction between Luxemburg and the 
socialist party which betrayed her, and the communist party which sought to distance itself from 
her legacy. Yet as a result, Arendt tears Luxemburg from her historical context and from the 
theoretical debates within socialist politics that gave her political thought meaning. Arendt’s 
portrait of Luxemburg reflects her own revolutionary theories based on the philosophical 
concepts developed in The Human Condition. Arendt’s separation of social and political spheres 
closes the possibility of the expansion of democracy into the economic realm. As such, it is 
difficult to reconcile Arendt’s theory of revolution with a leftist such as Luxemburg.  
While Luxemburg combined her Marxist theoretical analysis with a dialectical method of 
spontaneity and organization, Arendt’s ontological politics was based on an understanding of the 
threat that the Social held for politics. Arendt articulated her portrait of Luxemburg through this 
lens and thus extruded the Marxist aspects of Luxemburg’s thought. As a result, their two 
revolutionary visions are difficult to reconcile. However, there is a fruitful avenue of analysis 
available in a comparison of their mutual subtextual engagements with their positions as 
outsiders among their political worlds. Feminist reinterpretations of both thinkers are especially 
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interesting considering their ambivalent relationship to the women’s movements of their time 
and commitments to universalist politics—as Rose notes, the relationship between “un-
belonging” and their wider political thought and engagements remains a promising area for 
engaging with both thinkers.  
Arendt’s ontological politics, particularly her theory of council republicanism, are 
difficult to reconcile to the modern world. Luxemburg’s revolutionary theory, similarly, is less 
immediately applicable to a contemporary world in which rebuilding a socialist movement is 
necessary before any discussion of reform or revolution could take place. Similarly, the 
limitations of her own revolutionary theory point to the problems in placing revolution at the 
center of democratic political theory. The limitations of Arendt’s portrait to reinterpret 
Luxemburg outside of a socialist context point to the difficulty of reconciling these two 
positions.  Yet in spite of this, Luxemburg’s thought opens the possibility explicitly closed by 
Arendt: that of democratizing the economic sphere which is divorced from political democracy 
in capitalism.  
Finally, as democracy appears again to be under a new threat of “dark times,” what can 
be gleaned from this encounter between Arendt and Luxemburg? The threats from far-right 
populism to liberal democracy, and the destabilizing effects of economic and environmental 
catastrophe point to questions that both thinkers asked: from where does liberal democracy draw 
its strength? For both thinkers, revolution provided an answer. Yet what remains when the 
centrality of revolution is removed? Both Arendt and Luxemburg’s commitment to democratic 
institutions as the channel through which public freedom can be explored and flourish can 
remain a useful position in our current era. The relationship between direct democracy, whether 
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in the wards, worker’s councils or other forms, to representative democracy perhaps opens one 
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